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Abstract 
 
Letting “Mad Dogs” Lie: Anglo-American Journalism  




 There have been many scholarly efforts covering the period in the Soviet Union known as 
the Great Terror; most often these writings tried to contextualize and understand the inner 
working of the regime or its people. The present work shifts this lens, since it seeks to uncover 
how Anglo-American audiences grappled with one significant event from that era: the 1936 Trial 
of the Sixteen, the first of Stalin’s major show trials. As the Old Bolsheviks were led to the 
slaughter, people in the West received a myriad of information concerning this very public 
spectacle. A lack of functional newspaper scrutiny as the event took place, combined with the 
charged rhetoric of politicized post-trial publications, ultimately ensured that no outlet offered 
information about the trial beyond the apparent legitimacy that it gave to their specific causes. 
The trial itself therefore became more than the prosecution of sixteen individuals, as the entire 
affair allowed interested parties to manipulate the overall meaning to suit causes or ideologies 
that were either in favor of or completely against the current Soviet regime. Such an undertaking 
necessarily includes close readings of both works on the Terror and journalistic approaches to the 
period in order to demonstrate the conclusions of this thesis. In focusing on a single event, there 
is hope that some light can be shed on the larger problems associated with the spread of 
information across the globe during this significant period.  
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A Note on Terminology 
 
In the transliteration from Russian to English, many of the studies utilized in this thesis 
opt for different styles. In order to maintain a sense of consistency, the names and locations will 
follow a similar Library of Congress (LOC) system to that featured in J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. 
Naumov’s The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932-1939. As 
such, the following section was lifted from that publication: 
In final position: 
ii in the LOC system becomes y (Trotsky, not Trotskii) 
iia = ia (Izvestia, not Izvestiia) 
nyi= ny (Nagorny, not Nagornyi) 
In initial position: 
E = Ye (Yezhov, not Ezhov) 
Ia = Ya (Yaroslavsky, not Iaroslavsky) 
Iu = Yu (Yudin, not Iudin)* 
Similarly, several names have been anglicized for easier reading, most notably Joseph 
Stalin, as opposed to Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin. However, any newspaper articles with different 






* J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov, The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932-
1939 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), xix.  
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Introduction: The Importance of the News 
 The lightning fast speed at which information spreads is taken for granted in the modern 
world. Thanks to technological advances in recent years, the world appears smaller than ever, 
readily accessible with the click of a button or the touch of a screen. As a result, there is easy 
access to news information of practically any conceivable variety, as it literally exists at our 
fingertips. A realistic problem then falls to choosing from among the countless available sources 
in order to stay informed. These modern conveniences are not inherently negative, and any 
debates concerning such matters can be left to those willing to undertake them. Leaving aside 
moralistic judgments surrounding the idea of information overload allows for an examination of 
the mechanisms and sources that offer forth the quick and ready access to the news itself. In 
contemporary times, that field is open to nearly anyone able to publish, post, or stream their 
stories. Even private citizens can now co-exist with massive media empires, offering their take 
on the news via a myriad of available options: television, radio, social media sites, online news 
sources, blogs, podcasts, live streams, and even print media, which continues to labour on 
despite the competition from these modern means of communication. But it was not always this 
easy to obtain information about disparate parts of the world.  
 Before the Internet, before 24-hour news stations, even before the rise of radio, the world 
invariably seemed like a much larger place. While foreign correspondents had to work 
differently than they do today, these eras do share a commonality: speed – something that cannot 
be separated from the spread of information. Whoever got the news the fastest could sell it 
before the rest, so speed became crucial as journalism evolved into a profitable industry. To 
quote John Maxwell Hamilton, “the market value of news – and newspapers – was increasingly 
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tied to how new the news was.”1 Spending too much time writing or researching a story meant 
that you could lose out to rivals who printed the information faster than you, all of which related 
to the business model that informed journalism as soon as the first foreign correspondents 
appeared in earnest during the mid-19th century.2 Such a statement holds true to this day, as 
modern technology allows for constant updates, which in turn helps explain why instances of 
misinformation are relayed to audiences, either purposefully or accidentally.  
 This brief foray into the potential uncertainties and dangers associated with contemporary 
news coverage might seem odd in a work that will focus on the volatile and violent years of the 
interwar Soviet Union. However, it is the very instability of that time which requires an 
appreciation of the many converging avenues that surround the topic. One major news event 
covered by Anglo-American journalists was the infamous 1936 “Case of the Trotskyite-
Zinovievite Terrorist Centre.”3 The first of the Soviet Moscow Trials, also known as the Trial of 
the Sixteen and the First Moscow Trial, occurred when sixteen individuals were tried and 
executed for murder, treason, and assassination attempts. Some of these defendants were 
longstanding members of the Bolshevik party; in other words, men with ties to the party’s 
origins, the 1917 Revolution, and the establishment of the Soviet regime. The accused included 
Grigory Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev, Ivan Smirnov, Grigory Yevdokimov, Ivan Bakayev, and 
others.4 Perhaps most importantly, the charges against them were also completely fabricated, 
with the defendants being the ones to volunteer the confessions that led to their deaths. In order 
to understand how news information about this event was gathered, circulated, and subsequently 
                                                 
1
 John Maxwell Hamilton, Journalism’s Roving Eye: A History of American Foreign News Reporting  (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University, 2009), 54-55. Italics in the original.  
2
 Although some may consider the title “correspondent” as different from “reporter” or “journalist,” these terms will 
be used synonymously for all intents and purposes  throughout this work. 
3
 Although there remains a major focus on Anglo-American sources in the current study, they are oftentimes 
designated as “Western,” which is not an effort to establish an all-encompassing approach. 
4
 See Appendix 1 for a fu ll list of the defendants. 
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interpreted (or misinterpreted), a solid grasp of the processes in place is necessary. 5 The 
crossover of history and journalism provides a distinct approach to this difficult subject matter 
which speaks to the intense human misery that arose throughout this period. This research will 
offer a blended mix of sources on the Great Terror (which reached its most violent stages in the 
years 1937-1938), since that body of work includes accounts by the journalists and diplomats 
who witnessed and offered forth their interpretations of the trial. Their works also enable us to 
understand the means by which the news of events in Moscow traveled and was made available 
to ordinary citizens around the world. If tensions abounded between the East and the West even 
before the outset of the Cold War, the First Moscow Trial acts as a specific instance on which to 
concentrate our understanding of the spread of information at the time.  
 A small aside on the subject matter itself is needed, as it is obvious that more than one 
major news event took place in the Soviet Union in the tumultuous 1930s. The choice of 
focusing on this specific case is not to imply that this trial was more important than those that 
came before or after, or that the fates of sixteen individuals deserve more consideration than the 
millions affected by Stalinist policies.6 Instead, the public nature of the show trial allows for a 
concentration on the crossover between history and journalism, based on the coverage of the trial 
itself. Since the Trial of the Sixteen was the first major show trial that resulted in the deaths of 
Old Bolsheviks, as well as its close proximity to the most brutal period of the Great Terror, it can 
act as a worthwhile case on which to center an analysis of the era. Using this moment is also 
                                                 
5
 Throughout this work, the Case of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre will also be referred to as the First 
Moscow Trial and the Trial of the Sixteen to avoid repetition. Similarly, the period in question will often be referred 
to as the Terror. 
6
 Show trials became a mainstay of Soviet life as the regime established itself in the 1920s. By the 1930s, they were 
practically commonplace. See, among others, Julie Cassiday, The Enemy on Trial: Early Soviet Courts on Stage and 
Screen (DeKalb, IL: No rthern Illinois University Press, 2000); Elizabeth A. Wood, Performing Justice: Agitation 
Trials in Early Soviet Russia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); and William Chase, “Stalin as Producer: 
The Moscow Trials and the Construction of Mortal Threats,” in Stalin: A New History, eds. Sarah Davies and James 
Harris (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 226-248. 
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important due to the changes in opinion inspired by the Terror, not the least of which concerned 
the possible arrest or execution of Americans living in the USSR. 7 This effort does not seek to 
undermine works on the everyday Soviet citizen who suffered immensely during the Terror, and 
such publications deserve praise for researching such a demanding facet of Soviet history. At the 
same time, being dragged into debates on the legitimacy of certain academic undertakings over 
others contributes next to nothing in terms of furthering our knowledge of a particularly 
uncertain historical period. If the Western media of the era focused on events such as show trials 
over potential alternatives, that knowledge offers contemporary researchers insight into what was 
deemed important or “newsworthy.” In turn, connecting the East and the West through media is 
one means of avoiding a strict nation-centric focus that cannot account for the intricacies of 
foreign relations in a world growing smaller than ever before. As a result, my work will be 
deliberately transnational in focus.  
 It is important that one never forgets the more ominous possibilities associated with 
journalism and its correspondents. Harold J. Laski writes that “there is an unconscious deception 
in reporting, as well as a conscious deception; which of the two is responsible for the greater 
amount of false judgments is difficult to say.”8 The notion that reporters have their own agendas 
seems to undermine the relationship between the free press and an informed public. As one 
delves into the many publications of the 1930s, it remains imperative to consider the 
correspondents as individuals with their own biases, who were in no way above writing their 
stories with a specific purpose in mind, and who wanted to keep their prestigious positions no 
matter the cost. In turn, the editors and owners of the news outlets also influenced the content of 
                                                 
7
 David S. Fogelsong, The American Mission and the “Evil Empire:” The Crusade for a “Free Russia” since 1881  
(New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 80.  
8
 Haro ld J. Laski, “Introduction,” in Robert W. Desmond, The Press and World Affairs (New Haven and London: D. 
Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1937), xxiii.  
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their publications based on their own beliefs, and values. Even beyond journalists, there were 
many others who attempted to use these news stories to influence public opinion for their own 
ends. Finally, consumers made decisions (consciously or unconsciously) about sources and the 
institutions to which they subscribed. While purposefully false reporting was rare (but not 
unheard of), to this day there remains a potential danger in accepting what certain publications 
offer forth without a critical eye, or else individuals risk avoiding any news that does not 
conform to their own preconceptions on the subject matter.  
 As the Soviet Union grew into an established and recognized nation, the world 
necessarily began to take notice. The many alternatives to American or European viewpoints that 
exist today were not as readily available in the 1930s. As such, a focus on the West (and 
particularly on American and British sources) in this context is less about reinforc ing an already 
dominant perspective than it is about examining how that perspective shaped issues throughout 
the period in question. It was Stephen Kotkin, in his influential work Magnetic Mountain: 
Stalinism as a Civilization, who remarked on the potential impact of the Soviet Union on the rest 
of the world; he noted that “few scholars have taken up, even in general terms, the influence of 
the USSR on Western Europe and the United States.”9 As representatives of the major world 
powers at the time, American and European reporters wielded considerable influence, especially 
in light of the vastly different (and limited) media landscape. The 1930s also offer insight into 
both the beginning and the end of stages in the history of journalism, as the “golden age o f 
foreign correspondence” flourished during the interwar years. 10 It is through all of these 
seemingly separate, yet often converging, avenues that we will now travel.  
 
                                                 
9
 Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 
392, n. 88. 
10
 Hamilton, Journalism’s Roving Eye, 2. 
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1 – Historiography: Understanding the Landscape of Historical Writing on the Soviet 1930 s 
 Academic works on the Soviet Union, and the Great Terror in particular, have been an 
actively published subject for decades. Reforms in the Gorbachev era allowed limited Western 
access to previously hidden archives, thereby widening the scope for researchers who were intent 
on pursuing new approaches to Soviet history.11 But it was the 1991 fall of the USSR that 
allowed for the massive influx of new publications, and made the past seventy-four years of 
Soviet rule more of an open field of study than ever before. The number of publications that 
followed was astounding, offering up dynamic interpretations and reconsiderations of the Soviet 
Union that were never before possible.12 New approaches to culture and resistance moved into 
the forefront of analyses about the 1930s, although the Great Terror remained an area of 
significant interest.13 Despite the access to archival documents and data, an issue concerning 
these efforts remains pertinent. Simply put, many scholarly works on the Great Terror regard the 
era within a purely Soviet context. While it is no doubt important, even necessary in early stages, 
to consider such a period in terms of its effects on Soviet citizens, this internal focus leaves a 
void in understanding how events from that period went beyond the confines of one, albeit large, 
nation. Stating the transnational possibilities associated with studies on the Terror does not 
diminish its established and tragic effects on the Soviet people. Instead, demonstrating how such 
                                                 

 It is important to note at this moment that there are little to no Russian language texts used for this work, unless 
previously translated. Aside from the author’s lack of proficiency in the language, there remains a plethora of work 
on the Soviet Union from Western sources, and a Western (or Anglo-American) consideration necessarily dominates 
the focus of the overall p iece. 
11
 Donald J. Raleigh, “Doing Soviet History: The Impact of the Archival Revolut ion,” The Russian Review 61, no. 1 
(2002), 16-19.  
12
 The openness allowed for scholars to consider means of improving a system that was inaccessible only several 
years before. See Patric ia Kennedy Grimsted, “Increasing Reference Access to Post-1991 Russian Archives,” Slavic 
Review 56, no. 4 (1997): 718-759. For an interesting analysis of the Russian archives throughout history, see Jan 
Plamper, Archival Revolution or Illusion? Historicizing The Russian Archives and Our Work in Them, Jahrbücher 
Für Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge, 51, no. 1 (2003), 57-69. 
13
 Hiroaki Kuromiya, “Accounting for the Great Terror,” Jahrbücher Für Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge, 53, 
no. 1 (2005), 86-87. See also Mark Von Hagen, “The Archival Gold Rush and Historical Agendas in the Post-Soviet 
Era,” Slavic Review 52, no. 1 (1993), 96-100. 
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deadly repression, which developed in a single country, was understood beyond national borders 
offers the opportunity to trace how such a devastating period was interpreted and considered by 
people in a different area of the world. In terms of the scholarship concerning the 1930s, there 
were three distinct phases, set chronologically, that still oftentimes converged with one another.  
 The first phase reveals Western criticism of the Soviet Union, which flourished during 
the Cold War period. Commonly fitting under the umbrella term o f the “totalitarian” model, 
these works focused on the idea of Joseph Stalin as dictator and sole power leading the Soviet 
Union. Disregarding the ideological nuances between East and West, this model considers Soviet 
society through a top-down view that necessarily discounts the autonomy of ordinary citizens by 
emphasizing the role of a leader who pushed forth an agenda of terror on the helpless populace. 14 
The notion of an ongoing and distinct threat to Western capitalism posed by this alternative 
system flourished even after the death of the Soviet Union’s most notable dictator. 15 
Perhaps the most significant work arising from the totalitarian paradigm was Robert 
Conquest’s The Great Terror: Stalin’s Purge of the Thirties. First published in 1968, it became a 
mainstay in Soviet historical studies and was revised and re-published on numerous occasions, 
with the author claiming that many credited him with coining the term “Great Terror.”16 
Conquest completely backed the idea of Stalin’s total authority, detailing his rise to power after 
Vladimir Lenin’s death (namely the defeat of both Stalin’s Leftist and Rightist rivals in the 
1920s), with the Terror considered as an inevitability based on the Soviet system and its leader. 17 
While attempting to widen the purview of the Terror to focus on high estimates of the number of 
                                                 
14
 Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Revisionism in Soviet History,” History and Theory 46, no. 4 (2007), 80. 
15
 David C. Engerman, Know Your Enemy: The Rise and Fall of America’s Soviet Experts (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 66; and Adam B. Ulam, “The New Face of Soviet Totalitarianism,” World Politics 12, no. 3 
(1960), 391, 399-400. 
16
 Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), v ii. 
For an example of this phenomenon, see Oleg V. Khlevniuk, The History of the Gulag: From Collectivization to the 
Great Terror (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2004), 140.  
17
 Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment, 3, 7-12, 15-19. 
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victims,18 significant space was devoted to major events surrounding the Terror, such as the 
death of Sergei Kirov and the Moscow Trials. Kirov was a popular Bolshevik official who was 
assassinated on December 1, 1934. The following days and months saw a tightening restriction 
on Soviet laws, allowing for the arrest, trial, and execution without the right of appeal of Soviet 
citizens accused of terrorism. Calling it the “crime of the century” for all the subsequent harm 
done as a result, Conquest lays the blame for the actual assassination at Stalin’s feet. 19 When 
considering the Moscow Trials, he systematically denies the show trials’ validity by 
deconstructing the processes involved in the sentencing of the defendants. In terms of the Trial of 
the Sixteen, these processes concerned the lack of substantial material evidence aside from the 
confessions of the accused.20 The show trials figured prominently, but not exclusively, in 
Conquest’s analysis of the larger Soviet system. 
The Great Terror, like other works from its time, was published before the possibility of 
gaining significant access to Soviet documents and archives. 21 Aside from the sources scholars 
could actually access, Conquest made use of émigré memoirs and the like; however, he almost 
totally dismissed Soviet-sanctioned publications, which he considered “worthless” due to the 
“falsification” of such documents.22 A further point is that some general statements by Conquest 
leave much to the imagination of the reader, especially in terms of connections to the West. In 
detailing the courtroom atmosphere, he focuses on the approximately thirty foreign journalists 
without mentioning many of their identities. Similarly, he considers the Moscow Trials as 
                                                 
18
 Conquest argues that a total number of deaths associated with the Terror can never be known, but estimates that it 
can be no less than fifteen million people. See Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment, xv i. 
19
 Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment, 37 (“crime of the century”). The entire affair is covered, and 
Conquest’s opinions made clear, between pages 37-52. 
20
 Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment, 107. The Case of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Center is 
covered in detail between pages 78-109. 
21
 The Smolensk Archive was used for these purposes. It housed Soviet documents taken by the Germans in World 
War Two, which in turn fell into American hands after the conflict. Merle Fains od also made use of these limited 
documents in Smolensk under Soviet Rule (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958).  
22
 Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment, xiv. 
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moments “which shook the entire world,” without offering further insight as to the meaning 
behind such a statement.23 One of the instances when Conquest considers the West in relation to 
the Soviet Union is a lament about the difficulties in transmitting word of an event such as the 
Terror to a Western audience.24 The vagueness of such proclamations does little to advance an 
appreciation for any concrete effects of the Moscow Trials beyond the Soviet Union; instead, it 
offered firm grounding for an anti-Soviet paradigm that persisted during this stage of historical 
writing. In pushing for Western ideals – such as “freedom of judgment and freedom of the press” 
– in the Soviet world, the author exemplifies the mentality of the Cold War era by attributing 
Western values to a foreign nation.25 The importance of Conquest’s work lies more in its 
durability than in either its theoretical underpinnings or the vehemence of the overall argument.  
Beginning with The Great Terror is not to claim that there were no precedents 
concerning the totalitarian model,26 but it is imperative to consider the connection between this 
first phase (in which Conquest’s work is perhaps the best known example) and the mentality 
surrounding the Cold War. Totalitarianism as a theory also received support from within the 
Soviet Union, through the works of Roy A. Medvedev. After the publication of his voluminous 
Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism (1971), Medvedev followed up 
with On Stalin and Stalinism (1979), in which he continued to focus almost exclusively on Stalin 
and “his epoch.”27 In taking a Marxist perspective, he offered an alternative frame of reference to 
                                                 
23
 Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment, 91, 109 (“which shook the entire world”). 
24
 Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment, 250-251. 
25
 Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment, 463. 
26
 For example, see Nathan Leites and Elsa Bernaut, Ritual of Liquidation: the Case of the Moscow Trials (Glencoe: 
The Free Press, 1954); Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Permanent Purge: Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1956); and Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, Stalin and the Soviet Communist Party: A 
Study in the Technology of Power (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959). A small aside, Conquest later called his 
use of the term “totalitarianis m” as “descriptive” more than a “model,” though such distinctions seem reactionary 
more than anything. See Robert Conquest, “Academe and the Soviet Myth,” National Interest 31 (Spring, 1993), 95. 
See also Engerman, Know Your Enemy, 328. 
27
 Roy A. Medvedev, On Stalin and Stalinism, trans. Ellen de Kadt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), ix.  
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Conquest, while still subscribing to the same paradigm, in which Stalin remained the focal point. 
Medvedev’s work was published both in the Soviet Union and (in a translated version) in the 
West, although its connection to the popular totalitarian model may account for its wide scope 
during the Cold War. 
Despite this apparent support from within the USSR, the broader, pre-existing tensions 
between the capitalist West and communist East were exacerbated in the years after the Second 
World War. Such an atmosphere allowed for a polarization of the “us against them” mentality, 
leaving little room for deviation.28 In turn, the use of publications by those who escaped the 
Soviet regime had a particular resonance, since they offered first-hand accounts that could lend 
support to totalitarian claims.29 Some of the best known works include Walter Krivitsky’s In 
Stalin’s Secret Service (1939), Alexander Barmine’s One Who Survived (1945), Victor 
Kravchenko’s I Chose Freedom (1946), and Alexander Orlov’s The Secret History of Stalin’s 
Crimes (1954). Many of the memoirs emphasized a line of ideological failings based on Stalinist 
totalitarianism.30 These apparent justifications for their writing allowed scholars during this 
period to offer forth comparisons between the Soviet Union and other totalitarian systems, most 
notably Nazi Germany under Adolf Hitler.31 Indeed, Conquest makes the striking assertion that 
there was a degree of admiration from Stalin for the Nazi dictator, at least in terms of how he 
dealt with political opponents.32 These types of connections further supported the totalitarian 
paradigm, as sharing similarities with the Nazis was a definitive means of ensuring continued 
                                                 
28
 Lynne Viola, “The Cold War in American Soviet Historiography and the End of the Soviet Union,” The Russian 
Review 61, no. 1 (2002), 25-26. 
29
 E.H. Carr was crit icized for not utilizing émigré sources in his series A History of Soviet Russia (first published in 
1950), an indicat ion of their rising prominence. See Fitzpatrick, “Revisionis m in Sovie t History,” 85, n. 24.  
30
 Jay Bergman, “The Memoirs of Soviet Defectors: Are They a Reliable Source about the Soviet Union?” Canadian 
Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne Des Slavistes 31, no. 1 (1989), 9-10, 19. See also Kevin McDermott, 
“Archives, Power and the ‘Cultural Turn’: Reflect ions on Stalin and Stalinis m.” Totalitarian Movements & Political 
Religions 5, no. 1 (Summer, 2004), 6. 
31
 Fitzpatrick, “Revisionism in Soviet History,” 80.  
32
 Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment, 65. 
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animosity between the people in the West (as the targeted audience of English- language 
scholarship) and the Soviet Union. Even if their publications occurred well after the 
establishment of the totalitarian model, The Great Terror and similar undertakings offered 
seemingly comprehensive evidence, justifying the Cold War mentality from which it was 
produced. 
The internalized focus of the totalitarian model (necessitated through its consideration of 
dictator control as all-encompassing) was not above reproach, as seen in works such as E.H. 
Carr’s The Soviet Impact on the Western World (1973). Based on a series of lectures given over 
two decades earlier, Carr looks to how the Soviet Union affected the West, all within an 
optimistic (to the degree that some might consider naive) perspective on postwar unity. 33 Carr 
offers early insight of the Soviet Union in a more transnational context. Even though he focuses 
on Western nations (specifically Great Britain) instead of a wider array of affected countries, 
such a narrow focus is more of an indication of the times, similar to writings in the interwar era.  
As the Cold War progressed into the late 1960s and 1970s, a desire to consider Soviet 
history in a new light led to the second stage of historical writing, that of the “revisionists.”34 
Moving away from authoritarian politics into the realms of social history, revisionists offered a 
redirected focus and a “new cohort of historians” who moved from a top-down to a bottom-up 
view of society.35 While not all-encompassing,36 revisionists looked to elements of Soviet society 
                                                 
33
 E.H. Carr, The Soviet Impact on the Western World (New York: Howard Fertig, Inc., 1973), v ii-ix, 112-113. 
34
 McDermott, “Arch ives, Power, and the ‘Cultural Turn,’” 6-7; and Robert C. Tucker, “The Stalin Period as an 
Historical Problem,”  The Russian Review 46, no. 4 (1987), 424-425. Tucker indicates that political scientists were 
moving away from totalitarianis m before historians.  
35
 Sheila Fitzpatrick, “New Perspectives on Stalinis m,”  The Russian Review 45, no. 4 (1986), 35 (“new cohort of 
historians”). For further examples of this shift, see Tucker, “The Stalin Period,” 426; Wendy Z. Goldman, Terror 
and Democracy in the Age of Stalin: The Social Dynamics of Repression  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 7-8; and Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Constructing Stalinis m: Changing Western and Soviet Perspectives,” in The 
Stalin Phenomenon, ed. Alec Nove (London: Weidenfeld & Nico lson, 1993), 82-83. 
36
 Some Sovietologists took exception to the apparently overarching wave of revisionism being synonymous with 
social history, as well as taking issue with the consideration of the Soviet social history being necessarily linked to 
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that had been ignored in the past, instead of singling out Stalin and the political elite. These 
elements included moments throughout the Terror that had the power to change the surrounding 
landscape. Another criticism covered by revisionists was the connection between the totalitarian 
academic industry and Western government funding (American in particular), which seemed to 
undermine the overall credibility of all parties by engaging in a cycle where the research 
supported the system and the system continued funding the research. 37 During this period, there 
was still no significant access to the Soviet archives, but that did not slow efforts to undermine 
what revisionists understood as the firmly established, but significantly flawed, totalitarian 
model. 
In Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1921-1934 (1979), Sheila 
Fitzpatrick considers Soviet history through this new social lens, looking towards the evolving 
nature of education established in the early USSR, especially in terms its connection to “upward 
social mobility” of the non-elite.38 While not directly related to the Terror, her work offered an 
indication of a changing atmosphere within the field of Soviet studies, especially with respect to 
the lack of political motivations surrounding the scholarly work itself. While still analyzing how 
elites affected society, the entire social stratum was now up for consideration. 39 In terms of overt 
responses to the totalitarian approach, it was J. Arch Getty’s Origins of the Great Purges (1985) 
that considered the interwar period in a new light (and the Terror in particular). He focused on 
“evaluating structural, institutional, and ideological factors” with the use of “documentary 
evidence” wherever possible, although admitting to being forced to rely on speculation to some 
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degree.40 He specifically mentions Conquest and Medvedev, undercutting their reliance on 
memoirs (especially those listed above) and underground dissident accounts (often biased due to 
the fact they were smuggled to and printed in the West). Since the authors of many of the 
memoirs were not active in the upper echelons of the Party, their second- or third-hand accounts 
were less reliable sources than scholars of the totalitarianism view suggested. Getty took issue 
with the overall lack of critical analysis, as the goals for those writing the memoirs were never 
questioned (specifically in that they were defectors trying to sell a story).41 In terms of the First 
Moscow Trial, Getty claimed that the event constituted “the end rather than the beginning of 
something,” meaning that instead of a concentrated effort to begin a systemic purge, the trial 
seemed rather contained. The entire affair seemed to be full of contradictions, stops and starts, 
and uncertain moments.42 At this time, even moves into the lower echelons of Soviet society 
could seemingly not overcome the need to comprehend or discuss the Moscow Trials.  
 The attack on the totalitarian model did not go unanswered. Instead of collaboration, 
there were serious tensions between proponents of the two models, especially as it pertained to 
the 1930s (even more than to other periods).43 Revisionists considered their rivals as “Cold 
Warriors” with political motivations and government money obstructing their judgment, whereas 
those in the totalitarian school saw the revisionists as “whitewashers” who legitimized Stalin and 
the Soviet regime by removing blame from those deemed responsib le for mass violence.44 
Perhaps as a retort to such arguments, Getty claimed that Stalin still held primary moral 
responsibility for the Terror. However, it was not that the role of dictator was questioned, but 
there was a growing consideration that the Communist Party was not as all-encompassing as 
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previously thought, and that alternate approaches to understanding the period’s complexities 
were necessary.45 This common goal did not result in academic cohesion even amongst the so-
called revisionist scholars, who still subscribed to different fields within history. 46 Still, the 
revisionist model gained support as the 1980s progressed, becoming the mainstay based on the 
amount of work produced and the rising interest in social (as opposed to political) history. An 
interesting note is that this acceptance did not translate from the academic to the public sphere, 
as many still related the violence of the period to the actions of Stalin alone. 47 
 The move to a general acceptance of the broader revisionist model by scholars connects 
with the next stage in Western writing of Soviet history, what is referred to as “post-
revisionism.” The rise of the post-revisionists coincided with a move in the late 1980s towards 
examining cultural history, made even more important as the 1991 fall of the USSR allowed 
increased access to the Soviet archives. This trend followed a larger movement in the wider 
historical community, in that cultural considerations such as ideology could be understood 
through its construction by society’s innumerable elements, not only the elite. For those 
interested in the Soviet Union, both top-down and bottom-up views were problematic, as power 
relations move through many levels in society in order to function (and not strictly in a single 
direction). However, a major difference from the earlier historiographical shift is that post-
revisionists were significantly less heated in their debates than the practitioners of the totalitarian 
and revisionist models.48 
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 Even if experts in the field were not always in unison, a partial opening of the archives 
meant a significant increase in Western publications concerning the Soviet Union. Many 
revisionist scholars continued their efforts, working alongside a new group of academics intent 
on uncovering alternative means of regarding the Soviet period, and the 1930s were not exempt 
from their attention. Fitzpatrick and Getty continued to publish books, as these new documents 
allowed them to delve further into the Terror and its larger effects in more detail. 49 Although 
many sources became available, it was Kevin McDermott who noted that despite the “archival 
gold rush,” there were few major revelations uncovered, such as the truth behind Kirov’s death 
or a journal written by Stalin detailing his mindset. This discovery (or lack thereof) propelled 
researchers to consider different approaches to Soviet history, including degrees of support for or 
resistance to the regime. It remains important to note that the archives did indicate Stalin’s 
hands-on approach in certain matters, which means that there is little chance of separating him 
from the period completely. In turn, the power dynamics within the Soviet bureaucracy offer a 
new avenue in which to direct research.50 
As such, the 1990s led to numerous developments away from the p revious models. An 
important example of this ongoing phenomenon was Stephen Kotkin’s Magnetic Mountain: 
Stalinism as a Civilization (1995), in which the scholar lays out problems with both paradigms: 
while considering the totalitarianism approach as overly simplistic in its efforts to understand the 
Soviet Union, revisionists do little more than consider the chaotic nature of the period without 
offering a viable means of replacing the model they undermined. Taking this account further, the 
“middle ground” between these two models focuses on why the Terror occurred, instead of 
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considering how it managed to take place at all.51 It seemed impossible to avoid consideration of 
past debates, even as new approaches were becoming the mainstay, as if not only 
acknowledging, but overcoming past scholarship was a necessity in establishing oneself in the 
academic field. 
 In Popular Opinion in Stalin’s Russia: Terror Propaganda and Dissent, 1934-1941 
(1997), Sarah Davies considers the old debates to have overloaded the spectrum, so that alternate 
opinions to either model have been largely ignored. She advocates an approach that considers the 
voices that have been lost or silenced in the past, especially those caught up in the larger 
processes of moving throughout the Party bureaucracy.52 One of the major difficulties of 
accessing so many sources is that the entire landscape is clouded, and there can be few concrete 
answers at times. Davies shows that while dissent existed against Stalinist directives to control 
public opinion, others were completely taken in by the regime’s efforts. 53 However, just as works 
showing dissent of the Soviet population undermined the totalitarianism model, instances where 
potential revisionist “whitewashing” concerns also became evident. Robert Thurston’s Life and 
Terror in Stalin’s Russia, 1934-1941 (1996) undercuts the totalitarianism view as “irrelevant” 
due to the idea that efforts to exert total control would lead to unforeseen problems for the 
regime itself.54 In terms of the show trials, Thurston considers the small degrees of truth (such as 
the existence of an oppositionist bloc) within the fabricated charges as a means of exonerating 
Stalin of “plotting a campaign against the nation.” Instead, he was being reactive to the events 
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and legitimate threats occurring around him.55 By minimizing the guilt of Stalin to such a high 
degree and claiming that most citizens were loyal to the regime, Davies considers works such as 
Thurston’s to be the extremist version of revisionism. 56 Clearly, access to the Soviet archives did 
not result in total academic cohesion, although conflicts seemed less impassioned than before.  
Revisionist and post-revisionist historians continued to lead the debate, despite the 
revisionist approach apparently becoming the mainstay. However, these cultural movements in 
historical research did not mean that totalitarianism was completely forgotten.  Moving against 
post-revisionism became a viable means of approaching Soviet historical writing, again based on 
the seemingly inevitable blowback against the commonly accepted historiography. 57 Aside from 
the public, some historians also continued to include Stalin as the focus of their work. Oleg V. 
Khlevniuk’s Master of the House: Stalin and His Inner Circle (2009) operates on this trend, 
regarding the period through an understanding of the political relations between Stalin and the 
Party elite. While other historians may have moved onto social or cultural approaches, 
Khlevniuk uses Soviet sources to push the idea of Stalin’s power being “imposed from above,” 
rather than a consideration from below.58 Despite the different eras in which they published their 
respective works, Khlevniuk appears to be associated with Conquest and the totalitarian model. 59 
It also seems as though studies in political history (and the Moscow Trials) remain an area of 
interest, despite a move towards the cultural, transnational, or even the emotional sphere. 60 
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The many complexities concerning the Western historiographical treatment of the Soviet 
Terror can hardly be contained in this short overview, but suffice it to say that there were 
numerous personal, societal, and ideological differences coinciding with the evolving trends in 
historical writing. Sheila Fitzpatrick, a prominent member of the revisionist school, argues that 
the real causes of breaking with the totalitarian model (and even the later shifts to post-
revisionism) were more the result of generational over ideological adjustments, with younger 
scholars opting to take a different route than their predecessors. 61 If the new generation of 
scholars coincided with changing historical trends, then the longevity of these historiographical 
debates within the field indicate ongoing conflicts concerning the degree to which academic 
legitimacy is gauged, regardless of the subject matter under consideration. The ongoing 
controversies surrounding academic approaches to the 1930s and the Terror demonstrate that the 
personal opinions of the scholars themselves seem to indicate the tone of their approach, even in 
terms of considering their predecessors. Proving them wrong may have been more important 
than offering a new means of understanding the period.  
 Separated from the rigidity of historical works, publications on journalism during these 
decades also deserve a degree of consideration, especially since news coverage necessarily 
figures in the spread of information across national borders. Reporters often do not have the 
“formal training” of historians, but are instead required to gain practical experience on the job. 
The diverging opinions of reporters posted to the same country and writing on the same event 
indicate the existence of correspondents’ personal biases and the impossibility of uniformity. 62 
The differences between historical writing and journalism notwithstanding, those who write 
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about the latter field were frequently journalists themselves. 63 Their familiarity and experience 
allows for important insight that outsiders might not fully grasp, including the methodological 
complexities of foreign correspondence. At the same time, a potential problem of such writing is 
the style itself, as journalism is meant to be accessible to a wider audience, a motive perhaps not 
shared by historical works. However, efforts to weave a narrative do not immediately disqualify 
journalistic endeavors from their importance in terms of historical scholarship.  
 Even if journalists are the main contributors to the larger field of foreign correspondence 
and journalism studies, there are different methods through which they can center their work. 
Aside from actual newspaper articles from the era, two methods seem to be the most common. 
The first is memoirs, where correspondents recount their personal experiences relating to a 
specific period or surrounding a major event. Western correspondents sent to Moscow could 
relate their less filtered interpretations to audiences through such personal works, whereas 
newspaper articles require editor approval and must submit to the collective will of their targeted 
audience. While memoirs can add to the wider understanding of a period, there is an inevitable 
delay between their eventual publication (sometimes even decades later) and the event itself. 
This delay means that memoirs cannot wholly contribute to how an event was relayed to an 
audience at the time, only how the correspondent recalled (or chose to recall) their feelings about 
that event.64 An example relevant to the interwar period and some of the first foreign 
correspondents in Moscow was that several journalists who had experienced years within the 
confines of the Soviet system only published their own memoirs upon leaving the nation 
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altogether.65 While such works may shed light on how the period was understood in hindsight, in 
actuality they appear less journalistic and more experiential. The authors have their own reasons 
for voicing their opinions in such a manner; these choices remain an important factor to consider 
in utilizing their work in relation to major historical moments, in which they were participants.  
 The second means of relaying journalistic endeavors to the public was offering a more 
substantive history of journalism within a specific nation or a period of time. While not 
necessitating that a journalist authors such an effort, they oftentimes seem to lead the charge in 
many instances. The choice to take the reins may be based on the perception that others place 
more significance on the press’s shortcomings than the methods behind actual news gathering. 66 
Regardless, these works have a broader scope that necessarily leaves out historical complexities 
in order to cover the methods allowing for foreign correspondents’ work. Publications 
concerning the history of journalism also seem to offer advice concerning the “proper” behavior 
of reporters in the field, or even to lament on the current progression of journalism as a whole.67 
In issuing what can be construed as a defense of the entire profession, there sometimes exists an 
inherent disregard in covering its failures. The methodological approach itself therefore stands as 
a major hurdle, as efforts to justify an entire profession (made even more apparent due to 
contemporary shifts in technology) take precedence over details that journalists in particular can 
develop concerning their experiences in relation to the larger historical trends.  
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 A case where both of the above methods converge is Whitman Bassow’s Moscow 
Correspondents: Reporting on Russia from the Revolution to Glasnost  (1988). Moving across 
Soviet history, Bassow intertwines the experiences of other Western correspondents with his 
own, based on his time spent in the Soviet Union. Despite the inclusion of useful information 
(which will be considered in further detail below), one of the major issues remains the complete 
omission of the Great Terror. Bassow shifts from 1934 to the outset of World War II as if little of 
interest occurred in the interim.68 Such glaring discrepancies do little to offer readers a glimpse 
inside the gathering and distribution of news during one of the USSR’s most violent and 
uncertain periods. While perhaps a necessary sacrifice in order to cover the entire span of the 
Soviet Union, there remains much to be desired in terms of describing a particularly important 
era. This void cannot be overlooked, especially with respect to works that attempt to uncover 
specifics concerning the Terror.  
Despite larger historiographical trends, the common aspect of the majority of publications 
concerning the Soviet Union in the 1930s remains a distinct focus on the internal aspects of the 
Terror and its effects on the Soviet population (and, at times, how they affected the Terror). In 
terms of journalistic works, they tend to feature the correspondents more so than their subject 
matter. This trend may arise from the journalists themselves authoring many of these works, or 
possibly an effort to avoid the stigma of tedium associated with historical writing. Such 
approaches are in no way unsound; indeed, they offer distinct and important means of detailing 
the period. However, their specific and often nation-centric focuses can leave the reader without 
a firm grasp of the intricacies in terms of how the rest of the world was offered the means of 
understanding the Soviet Union at a specific point in time. The necessity of these efforts to 
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justify their approach in regard to those which preceded it also stands as a deficit to the overall 
body of work. A starting point for such an effort is comprehending how information circulated 
and actually passed from the Moscow correspondents to their Western audiences. The choice of 
the First Moscow Trial remains to center this work on a manageable, yet still significantly 
covered, event. Owing to its position as the first major show trial of the Old Bolsheviks, as well 
as its proximity to the most violent years of the Terror, there is a distinct opportunity to shed 
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2 – Reporting Practices in the Early Soviet Union, and the Rise of the Show Trial 
 Despite their infamy, the Moscow Trials were not the first instances of Soviet show trials, 
a phenomenon which pre-dates the origins of the state altogether. In the pre-revolutionary period, 
show trials, and even the presence of American or British reporters, were featured in the political 
landscape. Undoubtedly, the establishment of the Soviet Union changed this dynamic, although 
the connection remained between the evolution of show trials as an institutional mainstay and the 
presence of Western (American and British included) correspondents in the USSR. Such trials 
were by no means relegated to the USSR alone, as other European nations would utilize the same 
procedures during the period. The convergence between show trials and foreign correspondents 
arises from the basic idea that what occurred in the show trials needed to be relayed to the wider 
public in order for the events to properly serve their function in terms of establishing a distinct 
threat against the regime (made real through the trial itself). 69 As the Soviet media was controlled 
by its government, foreign correspondents in the USSR aided in spreading word of these threats 
by transmitting these lessons to an audience abroad. Before such an argument can be made, 
however, some context concerning these two seemingly distinct industries is necessary.  
In 1856, the major European news agencies (Havas in France, Reuters in Britain, and 
Wolff in Germany, all named for their founders) formed a cartel to solidify their control in the 
global dissemination of the news. By creating an oligopoly to and for the spread of information, 
their ability to influence public opinion was established – a fact even their respective 
governments could not ignore.70 The American equivalent lagged behind, with the Associated 
Press (AP) being relegated to the continental United States while the other agencies divided the 
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world into zones wherein they exerted full control over the spread of news. However, as the 
twentieth century began, the AP became a growing institution, setting up offices around the 
globe. This period also saw the emergence of journalism as a profitable business, where speed 
became the primary goal, even more so than professional and principled content. 71 These 
European and American organizations continued to dominate the field for years to come, 
especially as British and US news agencies were the few able to escape total government 
oversight.72 
The rise of the transatlantic news cable in the mid- to late 19th century drastically changed 
both the media and physical landscapes of the world, as previous delays associated with foreign 
news-gathering became less prevalent.73 However, these developments allowed the problem of 
cost to replace previous worries about speed. A striking example is the New York Tribune’s first 
transatlantic cable, sent in 1866 and comprised of forty-nine words, which cost approximately 
two hundred dollars to send. Cost was then an obvious downside to the emphasis on speed, 
which was enough to dissuade some publishers from pursuing international stories, especially 
those whose readers had a diminishing interest in foreign affairs.74 All the same, “foreign 
specials,” namely foreign correspondents who reported for a single newspaper, began to appear 
during this period. The technological advances of previous years made their jobs easier, although 
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cost was again a contributing factor in how they reported their stories.75 Despite this constraint, 
the “specials” enjoyed a freedom of which domestic reporters could only dream, at times 
resulting in opinions which could differ greatly from those held by their editors or publishers.76 
As such, there were likely some ongoing in-house clashes, as the distance between headquarters 
and correspondents in the field made oversight a major issue. Once agencies began to favor their 
business interests over journalistic integrity, the news became more of a “commodity instead of a 
public trust.”77 Newspapers therefore operated along a line of thinking that highlighted business 
practices. Correspondents in Russia made the existence of these problems painfully obvious, 
since reporters could not obtain permanent status under the tsarist regime, so there was a high 
degree of turnover in terms of the correspondents themselves. The Associated Press actually set 
up a Russian office in 1904, which helped to lighten the enforcement of censorship for all news 
agencies operating during Tsar Nicholas II’s reign, but even that did not entirely solve these 
overlapping journalistic difficulties.78 
The First World War necessitated an increase in the number of foreign journalists sent to 
Europe to cover the conflict, while also indicating the degree of control various governments still 
held over their respective press organs. Although wire costs remained high, the desire for 
constant wartime updates eclipsed these concerns, indicating how costs could be ignored if the 
right story came along.79 State-backed censorship was commonplace, going so far as to disallow 
non-Allied reporters from entering certain countries during the first years of the war. When the 
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United States did join the Allies, reporters entering France were then forced to make a personal 
pledge to the French army. Moreover, the American Expeditionary Force also set rules in place 
for correspondents, and censored stories that had the potential to undermine the security or 
capabilities of the American armed forces.80 They even mandated that publishers provide a bond 
of ten thousand dollars for their respective reporters; the total amount would be lost if the 
correspondent failed to follow the rules in place. Before being transmitted by cable, all news 
stories had to be approved by the official censor, a concept which many American reporters 
found difficult to accept. The war itself brought to light a growing hostility against government 
censorship, leading to efforts to avoid these restrictions whenever possible. One example of 
attempts to circumvent these censors was utilizing a code known to the editor, but not the censor, 
in order to cover an otherwise unmentionable story. Still, not all correspondents got away with 
such plans. For example, the New York World’s Heywood Broun published a story on American 
supply shortages, and was promptly sent home; the bond put up by his publisher was lost in the 
process.81 This degree of censorship was a preview of what was to come once reporters were 
allowed into the Soviet Union, although correspondents continued to make efforts to bypass such 
regulations.  
The later 19th century saw many political, social, and economic changes across the globe. 
Even during this period, which saw journalism undergo heavy adjustments, Russia under the 
tsars was no stranger to the concept of show trials. Well before the 1917 October Revolution led 
to Vladimir Lenin and the Bolsheviks seizing power, Tsar Alexander II’s 1864 legal reforms 
guaranteed the accused, among other rights, a trial by jury. While not the purpose intended by 
the tsarist regime, these trials offered revolutionary defendants a platform from which to spread 
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their message to a wide audience, and gave the public a glimpse of ongoing dissent against the 
political system. It is no wonder that such trials were often used by revolutionaries to voice their 
grievances with the state, and to outline its weaknesses. They could also increase their own 
credibility as arbiters of change in the public’s eye, which was especially important as these 
revolutionaries claimed to represent the interests of the people. 82 Perhaps the major difference 
between these tsarist trials and those conducted by the Soviet regime was the actual guilt of 
many of those accused under the tsars, as well as the express lack of political motivation (or 
awareness) on the part of the state. Julie A. Cassiday, whose work on the Soviet show trials links 
them to their theatrical roots, notes the difficulty in comprehending how the tsarist courts were 
seemingly blind to the opportunity afforded to the accused to become martyrs for their causes. 83 
 After the October Revolution and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk removed the nation, now 
led by the Bolsheviks, from the First World War, the new ruling party was in a less-than-secure 
state of power. All previous courts were formally discontinued, with local efforts and 
“revolutionary tribunals” replacing the old regime’s judiciary measures. 84 However, the decision 
was made early on to continue the pre-revolutionary tradition of show trials, though they were 
now meant to appeal to the broader “revolutionary conscience” for guidance. 85 Although Tsar 
Nicholas II had been out of power since February 1917, there was talk of putting the former ruler 
on trial for all the world to see. Obviously, such plans never came to fruition, as the tsar and his 
family met their grisly end without a trial. Still, some members of the provisional government 
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were put through this new court system; they included the minister of public welfare Countess 
Sofia Panina. American reporters, such as Bessie Beatty of the San Francisco Bulletin, were 
there to witness these first Soviet show trials. Overall, they proved to be rather disorganized 
events, despite a higher degree of involvement from the audience. If the guilty verdict was 
always assured before the outset, then trials in this early period were different from those to 
follow since they lacked the confessions and incessant self-abasement of the defendants. As 
Soviet show trials continued throughout the interwar period, such aspects would become 
commonplace. Another major difference stems from these early trials’ improvisational tone, as 
well from the diversity of the audience’s reactions. 86 Future proceedings would require a higher 
degree of state control in order to fulfill their intended purposes, but there would be no shortage 
of future trials. Even as these supposedly “revolutionary” means were put in place by the new 
regime, the Bolsheviks would never completely change their legal system from the pre-
revolutionary days, resulting in a mix of seemingly disparate laws and courts that were, at times, 
quite difficult to follow.87 
During the October Revolution, foreign reporters were not given access to the necessary 
cable services to send their stories abroad. Their efforts were further hampered by the fact that 
censors and clerks from the old and new regimes refused to work together. Even John Reed of 
the New York-based Call, who was sympathetic to the Soviet cause, could not send out his story 
on the revolution until November 15 – more than a week after the Bolshevik takeover.88 Reed’s 
connection to the Soviets became apparent all the same, and his monumental book, Ten Days 
that Shook the World, became a necessary read for Western correspondents planning to brave the 
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uncertainties of this new nation. The intimacy he developed with the Bolshevik leaders grew out 
of his own political views,89 and such biases would continue to affect reporting for years to 
come. Despite Reed’s journalistic efforts, the book itself was only published in March 1919, well 
after the described events took place. This kind of delay in the transmission of information would 
continue throughout the interwar years, meaning that efforts to stay informed of events in the 
USSR were hampered by the lack of reliable and timely accounts. Trustworthiness and speed 
were again at odds, an ongoing phenomenon in terms of spreading news of this important 
country to the West. The October Revolution, the end of Russian involvement in the First World 
War, and the ensuing civil war period led to rising tensions with the West, none of which would 
soon diminish. 
The Russian Civil War (which lasted from 1917 until 1922) saw a tightening of 
restrictions on foreign journalists, especially those who had been critical of the Bo lsheviks in the 
past. One such reporter was Walter Duranty, who was born in Britain but worked for The New 
York Times. Cutting his teeth in France during the First World War, Duranty was not always as 
ardently pro-Soviet as he is often remembered. Many of his early works on Russia were less than 
encouraging, highlighting the apparent dangers associated with the nation. 90 Like many other 
reporters, he was not permitted into Russia at first; he was forced to work out of Riga. The lack 
of proximity to the events in question indicated the difficulties in reporting on the Soviet Union; 
there was an overreliance on speculation, as well as indirect and biased testimony, in order to 
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write the news.91 On top of that, The New York Times came under fire due to a scathing report of 
its spreading misinformation on the Russian Revolution, especially in terms of predicting the 
regime’s downfall. Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz’s “A Test of the News” asserted that 
news coverage in Russia was “a case of seeing not what was, but what men wished to see.”92 
This public condemnation of the paper’s practices was likely a major concern, one which needed 
to be addressed in the coming years. Clearly, the lack of reliable information about Russia was 
an issue that The New York Times, as well as other papers of strong repute, needed to remedy.  
It was the famine resulting from the civil war that eventually (and reluctantly) opened 
Russia’s doors to Western correspondents. Certainly, journalists had managed to make their way 
into the nation over the previous months and years, most notably Marguerite E. Harrison of the 
Baltimore Sun. Harrison became a willing spy for the US military’s Intelligence Department, and 
she made her own way into a conflict-stricken Russia in 1920.93 However, the majority of 
journalists were not willing to risk their lives by blindly trekking into the country and hoping for 
the best. The situation changed when the Soviet government admitted to needing help in feeding 
its starving citizens. As one of the conditions for obtaining foreign aid, Western correspondents 
were allowed entrance in order to report on the overall distribution of food. These first reporters 
included: Walter Duranty (The New York Times), James Howe (Associated Press), Percy Noel 
(Philadelphia Ledger), Floyd Gibbons and George Seldes (Chicago Tribune), Frances 
McCullough (New York Herald-Tribune), and Sam and Bella Spewack (New York World), 
among others. Most of these individuals did not speak Russian when they first arrived in August, 
1921. While Duranty wrote a piece on the Soviet New Economic Policy that may have changed 
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the Bolsheviks’ view of him, it was Gibbons who took the most proactive approach to gain early 
admittance to the Volga region that was affected by the famine. 94 Based on a bluff that centered 
on him flying a plane into Russia, Gibbons was given access days before his competitors. 
However, his triumph was nearly undercut by troubles with the wire service, namely the lack of 
accessibility for an English-speaking reporter in Russia. To ensure he continued to outmaneuver 
his rivals, the intrepid reporter found the nearest telegraph office and had the staff change “each 
Latin character to its closest Cyrillic equivalent” before sending the wire to Moscow, where his 
colleague Seldes was waiting to re-transmit the story abroad.95 While the other reporters waited 
for transport from Moscow to the Volga area, Gibbons’s exclusive access angered their editors, 
who needed to license his stories from the Chicago Tribune in order to stay current during this 
early period.96 
Despite Soviet claims that censorship did not exist in the USSR, the reality was that it 
proved to be a major hurdle for Western journalists. Censors were employed by the Soviet Press 
Department, whose job requirement included curtailing any work deemed potentially harmful to 
the USSR’s interests. While censors may have claimed to allow “facts” to pass (only cutting 
“interpretation”), any criticism of the regime seemed to meet the censor’s pen, or in some cases, 
scissors.97 In particular, the American correspondents were not accustomed to the heavy hand of 
the state infringing on their writing. Before stories could be cabled abroad, a censor needed to 
sign off on the copy, with failure to comply with this rule resulting in possible expulsio n from 
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the USSR. These procedures, combined with an ignorance of most things Russian on the parts of 
the correspondents themselves, made the work difficult, leaving some Westerners to take matters 
into their own hands.98 
The most obvious way to avoid the challenges of Soviet censorship involved sending 
interpretive articles outside the Soviet Union to be cabled to home offices. Aside from finding 
willing travelers to carry the stories outside the USSR, some early correspondents took to using 
the diplomatic pouch of the American Relief Administration, from which news stories barely 
disguised as letters would be cabled to editors in Europe or America. However, this plan 
backfired when Soviet officials responded to the rumor that the pouch was being used for 
smuggling goods by arresting the courier and happening upon the reporters’ stories. As a result, 
Seldes, Noel, McCullough, and the Spewacks were expelled from the Soviet Union in 1923; it 
was an incident which showed the seriousness of not adhering to the rules in place.99 The threat 
of expulsion made real had the power to affect how reporters acted upon taking their position, as 
being a correspondent in Moscow was a premium placement that could turn a reporter into a 
household name back home, especially due to the escalation of real or perceived threats during 
the interwar period.100 Since the loss of that position may have also resulted in loss of 
employment, then there was a definite motivation in not straying from the status quo set in place 
by the Soviet government, which was a phenomenon that may have been internalized by Western 
reporters. With many of his rivals now expelled, Duranty took his place as the senior foreign 
correspondent in the Soviet Union, a role that he would occupy until his replacement arr ived in 
1934. Despite his controversial legacy (owing to his coverage of the 1932-1933 famine), Duranty 
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remains a central figure since he and other correspondents were exposed to numerous show trials 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s. 
Show trials in the Soviet Union provided Western reporters with a public spectacle to 
transmit to readers back home. At the same time, there was never any doubt in the minds of 
Bolshevik leaders as to the necessity of using these trials in order to instruct the Soviet masses.101 
Building on its tsarist foundations, the Soviet government would, over time, take a firmer hand in 
ensuring the trials educated the populace. However, there was a degree of, for lack of a better 
term, ‘trial and error’ concerning the entire process, especially in terms of spreading each trial’s 
calculated message.102 Over the following years, the Soviet government solidified its use of show 
trials as political tools, while continuing to see that each trial acted as an important journalistic 
event for Western correspondents. Some of the major Soviet show trials preceding the later 
Moscow Trials were: the Trial of the Socialist Revolutionaries (1922), the Shakhty Trial (1928), 
the Industrial Party Trial (1930), the Trial of the Mensheviks (1931), and the Metro-Vickers Trial 
(1933). While other trials no doubt occurred, both in Moscow and in the often-overlooked 
periphery regions of the USSR’s expansive landscape, those listed above served as precursors to 
the later Moscow Trials owing to their notoriety and extensive foreign press coverage. Similarly, 
the trial following the Reichstag fire in Germany also bears some interesting connections to the 
Moscow Trials, not the least of which was the unexpected outcome; it shows that the Soviets 
were not alone in attempts to utilize legal proceedings to convey a specific message. While 
covering each trial in its entirety would occupy far too much space, several distinct moments 
deserve further consideration in order to demonstrate the ongoing issues in communicating the 
meaning of the trials to American and British audiences.  
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The Trial of the Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) saw the Bolsheviks hold a defeated 
political group accountable for the nation’s major post-civil war problems, such as famine and 
lack of international recognition.103 It would not be the last time that the Soviets would scapegoat 
a specific group in order to cover for the larger socioeconomic issues plaguing the nation. 104 The 
proceedings, led by Prosecutor General Nikolai Krylenko, acted as a continuation of previous 
traditions, as the Soviet government was still attempting to perfect its use of the show trial. Even 
though the Soviets made efforts to publically condemn the SRs, the thirty-four defendants 
utilized established pre-revolutionary methods to essentially turn the trial into an opportunity to 
denounce their accusers. Despite their own political motivations, the Bolsheviks fell into the 
same position as Russia’s old rulers, giving their intended targets a platform to condemn the 
established system itself.105 However, a major difference from previous trials was the role 
designated for the audience. Spectators for the actual proceedings were specifically chosen from 
lists indicating their allegiance to the regime, in order to promote a consensus that would 
translate from the trial to the general public. Aside from that, the growing technological changes 
in terms of mass media affected Soviet citizens as they did those in the West, at least in terms of 
allowing wider exposure to the news. The resulting (and apparently spontaneous) reactions – 
including thousands marching through Red Square demanding death for the accused – indicated 
the degree to which Soviet citizens internalized the trial. 106 An interesting note was that, at the 
time, Western reporters condemned the trial’s “farcical indictments,” commenting that the trial 
was more based on indicating Bolshevik power to its own people than on actually seeking 
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justice.107 Aside from possible anti-Soviet bias, such pronouncements from the foreign press 
likely resulted from the defiant actions of the defendants, as well as indicating a loosening of 
censorship in the early Soviet period. As ever, the delay between the events themselves and their 
publication in certain Western presses remained a concern. Although less p revalent than before, 
the trial began on June 8, and The New York Times only published the story two days later.108 
While still appearing on the front page of the paper, the delay between the event and its 
transmission remained evident, despite the technological improvements made since the turn of 
the century.  
Despite the significant shortcomings of this early show trial, at least in terms of 
transmitting an intended message to an audience, Soviet officials would learn from such mistakes 
in terms of planning for future trials, although such planning could never fully account for all 
possible contingencies.109 In 1928, the Shakhty Trial offered another look at a Soviet show trial, 
though the political sphere had altered a great deal in the interim period. Falling after the 
infighting among the Bolshevik elite that arose in the wake of Vladimir Lenin’s death, this trial 
marked the first major instance of Soviet legal proceedings relayed to the public after Joseph 
Stalin took control of the Soviet Union. It also stands as the first trial to utilize 
“counterrevolutionary intent” as a means for indictment. 110 Ongoing Soviet fears concerning 
foreign powers, which had not completely evaporated after the civil war, meant that show trials 
would no longer be limited to Soviet citizens; here five German engineers numbered among the 
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defendants.111 However, the most important development was the use of confessions. While 
revolutionaries tried under the tsars, as well as the SRs only several years before, may have 
admitted their guilt (and were in many cases actually guilty), the Shakhty Affair transformed the 
show trial’s meaning and message: confessions became a necessity to indicate culpability. 
Although it was not completely unanimous, over ninety percent of the accused Soviet and 
German engineers admitted, during the trial, their guilt in sabotaging the USSR’s coal industry. 
An aspect of self- incrimination became a mainstay in selling the trials’ validity at home and 
abroad. However, this acquiescence by most of the defendants d id not mean total cohesion, as 
there were moments when some recanted their confessions in the courtroom. 112 Since the early 
proceedings saw numerous defendants proclaiming their innocence, these ongoing changes 
indicated a rather confusing atmosphere for Western correspondents.113  
Although the Shakhty Trial opened proceedings on May 18, 1928, the initial journalistic 
emphasis concerning the trial’s intrigue did not persist over its two-month duration. The opening 
day saw newspapers such as The New York Times publish the story on the front page, but that 
enthusiasm did not return until the court’s decision was reached on July 5, 1928; the interim 
period saw the story relegated to the paper’s later pages. 114 Western reporters did not know what 
to make of the entire trial, as confessions to this degree were no doubt confusing and difficult to 
undermine at the time. The language used by the Soviet press was also quite venomous, referring 
to the accused as “wreckers, vermin, insects, germs, [and] human garbage.”115 As a result of this 
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trial and the changes to the roles of the defendants (now shown as complicit to the regime’s 
wishes), the Shakhty trial was a major turning point concerning the use of show trials in the 
Soviet political arena; consequently, it set the stage for the trials to come.116 In terms of 
American coverage, reports were often published the following day, indicating the end of major 
delays stemming from technology, though not from censorship.  
The Metro-Vickers Trial in 1933 was an especially important moment leading up to the 
later Moscow Trials, as six British engineers employed by the Metropolitan-Vickers Electrical 
Export Company (along with twelve Russian defendants) were accused of wrecking Soviet 
power stations.117 The event built on the trends raised by the previous Stalinist show trials, and 
the prosecution was now led by Andrei Vyshinsky, who would feature so prominently in the later 
Moscow Trials. This time around, the proceedings were aimed at establishing a major foreign 
threat against the state – one that explained away its economic shortcomings. 118 Even before the 
trial began, Britain responded by halting trade talks with the USSR. As the controversy unfolded, 
diplomatic relations between the two nations would continue to weaken. 119 However, one of the 
more intriguing aspects of the trial coverage was the indication of how Western correspondents 
obtained their information. Being confined to Moscow, if not by law then by convenience, the 
Soviet newspapers Izvestia and Pravda offered Western reporters the primary means of 
information gathering. An ongoing phenomenon, based around the number of journalists who did 
not speak the language, reading these papers (through an interpreter) offered a glimpse into what 
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the Soviet government deemed pertinent to print.120 The obvious problem of such a method of 
news gathering was the total control the Soviet government exerted over the two publications, 
meaning that the lack of actual reporting remained a major issue.  
More so than in the previous trials, or even those to come, the Metro-Vickers Trial likely 
put Western reporters into a predicament. Stuck behind Soviet censorship, the Western world 
was being provoked as never before, so viewing the capitalist-communist divide without bias 
was likely a difficult task.121 The court proceedings also went somewhat differently, as the 
defendants sought legal counsel, and five of the six British engineers pled not guilty to the 
charges.122 Even the initial outlier would soon dispute his guilty plea, which was given based on 
a fear of the Soviet secret police (at this point named the OGPU). 123 As a result, the response by 
British audiences could not help but be tainted by claims of undue pressure on prisoners. Such a 
repudiation also undermines the power that the Soviets held over the show trials, especially with 
the First Moscow Trial fast approaching. Even though the Metro-Vickers Trial itself only lasted 
one week, there were daily updates in The New York Times, which oftentimes ran the story on 
the front page. The prominence of the coverage indicated that the choice of defendants could 
affect the manner in which the trial was covered and consigned within the newspaper itself. Even 
though the Soviet prosecutor maintained that the individuals were the targets, not the company or 
Britain itself, such a statement was difficult to consider at the time. 124 However, British reporters 
sent to Russia for the explicit purpose of covering the proceedings did not necessarily side with 
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their countrymen.125 Truly an odd case, the Metro-Vickers Trial resulted in the convictions of 
several defendants, although none were executed. 126 Such an outcome (despite the guilty verdict) 
would not recur in later trials.  
Another example of a show trial outcome that Soviet officials would have liked to avoid 
in their country resulted from the Reichstag fire in Nazi Germany. On February 27, 1933, the 
German parliamentary building was set ablaze. Communists were blamed for the fire, and those 
beginnings of an alleged conspiracy to start a communist revolution in Germany resulted in a 
tightening of Hitler’s tenuous grasp on power. Although a supposed Dutch communist, Marinus 
Van der Lubbe, was initially the only individual arrested for the crime, the circle soon widened 
to include Ernst Torgler, the leader of the German communists, as well as Georgy Dimitrov, who 
would later head the Communist International, as well as two other Bulgarian communists. 127 In 
a similar fashion to the early Soviet cases, the resulting show trial of these five defendants did 
not unfold according to plan, all under the eyes of Western journalists.  
Unlike the speed which typified Soviet show trials, the Reichstag fire trial took place 
over approximately three months, from September 21, 1933 to December 23, 1933. Based on the 
fact that the defendants were considered as communists, the German prosecution may have been 
overconfident in their assured victory. However, due to international pressure, the court was 
forced to endure the defence of the accused, made famous by Dimitrov himself, who incessantly 
berated and argued with the prosecution, even going toe-to-toe with Hermann Goering.128 
Dimitrov became a media darling in his own right, using the trial as a medium to defend 
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communism as an ideology and denounce the entire proceedings as “false, biased, and brutal.”129 
He appeared as somewhat of a fighter for justice to Western readers, and his “brilliant gallantry” 
was likely one of the primary reasons for the court’s decision; in the end, all defendants except 
for Van der Lubbe were acquitted, and the release of the majority of the accused cannot be the 
intended result of any show trial.130 The world took note, and the trial suffered for it, at least in 
terms of the intentions of those in power.  
These precursors to the Moscow Trials of the 1930s were important in terms of 
establishing the criteria for the defendants, the audience, and the Western press corps, but a small 
aside on the 1932-1933 Soviet famine is needed. A result of the intense Soviet drive to 
collectivize agriculture (embarked upon in order to fund the government’s nation-wide 
industrialization plan), this period has been ably covered by numerous scholars. 131 However, in 
terms of Western journalists in Moscow, this moment stands as a major failure in terms of 
broadcasting reliable information to their readers back home, owing to complacency and even 
outright deception. 
Concealing the famine offers an indication of the importance of show trials in the minds 
of journalists and their newspapers. While he was not the only reporter to do so, Gareth Jones of 
the Manchester Guardian made the decision to tour the regions affected by the famine in March 
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1933.132 After witnessing widespread starvation and death, Jones returned home and reported his 
findings. According to UP correspondent Eugene Lyons’s memoir Assignment in Utopia, 
Konstantin Umansky, the head of the Soviet Press Department, met with the Moscow 
correspondents, a group which included both Lyons and Duranty (the latter having won a 
Pulitzer Prize for his reporting in 1932). Under threat of losing access to the upcoming Metro-
Vickers Trial, the reporters agreed to repudiate Jones’s claims. 133 This agreement occurred 
despite the assembled newsmen knowing of both the famine’s severity and the loss of life 
outside of the capital. While it is unknown if they conferred with their editors before coming to 
such a decision, they apparently brought out food and drink afterwards, as if to celebrate. 134 
While Lyons was quick to condemn Duranty, despite also choosing to follow the scheme, his 
memory of that important event wavered over time, to the point of not even being certain of 
Duranty’s attendance when he was pressed at a later date. 135 Another uncertainty surrounding his 
account is the lack of confirmation by other journalists who were supposedly present. This 
suspect situation aside, Duranty’s overt claims against a famine during this period cannot be 
disputed, indicating how misinforming the public for personal gain or even simple convenience 
was none too difficult. 
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Aside from morally condemning the lack of effort on the part of many correspondents to 
inform the world of the crisis, another important issue arises – namely, the fact that foreign 
reporters themselves were relegated to Moscow. Despite the Soviet Union’s size, it was not until 
1976 that an American reporter was based outside of the Soviet capital.136 Even if the majority of 
“newsworthy” events occurred within Moscow, this short-sightedness on the part of the 
correspondents reveals an inherent flaw in their journalistic standards, especially in terms of 
informing their readers of major events occurring abroad. Based on its devastating end result, the 
1932-1933 famine stands as a prime example of this phenomenon, where adhering to the status 
quo potentially impaired possible efforts to intervene and save lives. 
Overall, it seems as though the public spectacle associated with the upcoming Metro-
Vickers Trial became more important than covering the famine in any meaningful capacity. Even 
if the trials themselves were denounced by many in the press corps, that outlook apparently did 
not detract from the need to cover the proceedings. As a result, the Soviets had discovered 
another means of controlling the words of the West’s so-called “free press.” Even as technology 
made the transmission of the news faster, with s tories being cabled for the following morning’s 
paper back home,137 there remained blatant obstacles to sending out truthful and accurate news 
accounts. Together, these early Soviet show trials created the foundations on which the 
upcoming Moscow Trials would stand, in terms of how the court system, the defendants, and 
Soviet population were taught to react, as well as concerning how Anglo-American 
correspondents and their audiences allocated their attention.  
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3 – Covering the First Moscow Trial 
 The Case of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre has often been subjected to 
scrutiny in Western scholarship. Efforts have been made to connect the trial (and those that came 
before and after) to the overall deplorable nature of the Stalinist regime, and especially to the 
dictator himself.138 It seems as though describing the purge trials became so commonplace in 
such works that, over time, they stood as a testament of the Soviet Union’s larger social, cultural, 
or moral deficiencies, with Stalin presented as guiding the entire process through his paranoia 
and bloodlust. Without attempting to minimize the leader’s role in orchestrating the Moscow 
Trials, these concerns were not the only topic of interest while the trials themselves were taking 
place; instead, reporters chose to focus on the daily proceedings, rather than stretch their analyses 
and consider the more far-reaching implications of the event.139 Since the fall of the USSR, 
scholars have been able to make extensive use of Soviet archival documents, yet the manner in 
which American and British journalists perceived and presented the trial while it occurred is 
rarely explored in these new studies. In order to make sense of the First Moscow Trial, debates in 
the late interwar era concerning on the trial’s legitimacy often included comparisons to the West 
from both supporters and detractors. For the Moscow correspondents, the overall focus was less 
on Stalin’s guiding hand than on the court processes and daily occurrences as the six-day public 
spectacle progressed. Interwar audiences were treated to the event’s pageantry, and any writings 
that looked to connect the trials to the regime’s ineptitude necessarily arose from the writers’ 
speculation, despite any possible validity of their statements. Amidst all the conflicting sources 
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of information, it seems highly unlikely that any conclusions drawn during the trial could be 
known for certain, especially for readers half the world away. As such, a reliance on the words of 
the limited number of journalists present posed some unavoidable issues for those seeking to stay 
informed about developments in the Soviet Union.140 
 The persecution of the Old Bolshevik defendants at the First Moscow Trial was not 
altogether unexpected (at least in hindsight).141 After the death of Vladimir Lenin, Stalin moved 
to the highest echelons of Soviet power by maintaining alliances with, and subsequently turning 
against, other prominent Bolshevik leaders; many of these leaders later became victims in the 
Moscow Trials. Stalin first began working with the Left Oppositionists Grigory Zinoviev and 
Lev Kamenev to undermine Leon Trotsky during the newly formed power vacuum. After 
successfully isolating Trotsky, Stalin broke with his former associates to ally with the Right 
Opposition, and by October 1926, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Trotsky had been removed from the 
Politburo (the body that actually governed the Soviet Union). After the Leftists’ defeat, Zinoviev 
and Kamenev capitulated and denounced their own actions, which offered a preview of their 
willingness to publically debase themselves. In 1928, Trotsky was exiled from Moscow and by 
February 1929, he was expelled from the Soviet Union altogether. Wasting little time, Stalin then 
moved against the Rightists, namely Nikolai Bukharin, Alexei Rykov, and Mikhail Tomsky. 
With the removal of Rightists from positions of influence during the First Five-Year Plan, their 
defeat by 1930 solidified Stalin’s position as the dominant leader of the USSR. 142 While they 
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would not completely disappear from view, the defeated Bolshevik leaders would never return to 
their former levels of power, and at times they were expelled from the Communist Party 
altogether.143 However, their moves against Stalin during his own rise to prominence would not 
be forgotten, as these instances later became the historical corroboration of their guilt in the 
accounts of some Western reporters.  
 As noted above, the death of Sergei Kirov in 1934 paved the way for changes in the 
Soviet courts system, wherein the accused could be found guilty and executed without the right 
of appeal. While the assassination itself garnered some attention in the press, it was really the 
resulting executions and supposed plots that gained significant traction. Within two days of the 
initial report of Kirov’s murder, many “White Guards” were arrested and tried for their alleged 
connections to the event. The detailed Western reporting indicates that the Soviets were making 
no efforts to hide their actions, including the end of appeals for death sentences. 144 While certain 
reporters diligently adopted the Soviet government’s rhetoric in their stories, others took a 
different tone and used the mass executions to “enlighten” their readers about the perceived 
backwardness of the USSR.145 Such harsh tones could only contribute to the overall conflicting 
viewpoints that emerged regarding the burgeoning nation in the years before the Terror began.  
                                                                                                                                                             
York: Penguin Press, 2014), Part III, chapters 10-14. While somewhat confusing, notions of “Left” and “Right” 
within the Soviet Union had little  to do with contemporary designations on the political spectrum, more in the 
degree to which adherents supported  various Communist policies, usually economic in nature.  
143
 See for example, “Stalin Fights to Hold Power,” United Press dispatch to The Washington Post (Oct. 12, 1932), 
6, in which Zinoviev and Kamenev were expelled for “alleged anti-party and counter-revolutionary activities.” They 
would be re-admitted and expelled on numerous occasions after Stalin’s rise to power.  
144
 Haro ld Denny, Special Cab le to The New York Times, “Soviet Arrests 71 in War on ‘Terror,’” The New York 
Times (Dec. 4, 1934), 1, 15; Our Own Correspondent, “New Red Terror,”  The Times  [London] (Dec. 4, 1934), 13. 
The latter report came from Riga, likely because either the London Times’s anti-Soviet stance led the Soviets to 
disallow them from send a correspondent into the Soviet Union itself, or because they chose not to themselves.  
145
 In particu lar, the London Times used the executions to compare the Soviets to the Nazis, bringing the reg imes 
together as a means of extolling the virtues of the “civilized European.” See the editorial “A Russian on 
Terrorism,” The Times [London]  (Dec. 12, 1934), 15. This vehemence may connect to the ongoing tensions in the 
wake of the Metro-Vickers Trial. 
  
Gentry   46  
The aftermath of the Kirov assassination reverberated in the presses as 1935 began, 
although perhaps nothing was more shocking than the report of Zinoviev and Kamenev’s 
complicity, along with that of many others, in Kirov’s death. 146 After their arrests, there was no 
initial show trial for these former Bolshevik leaders (as foreign press were prohibited from 
attending the closed proceedings), but the intrigue associated with their involvement could not be 
ignored. The court handed down no death sentences, as the state deemed that the Old Bolsheviks 
merely contributed to a political atmosphere that led to Kirov’s death, rather than actually 
plotting his murder. In this instance, Zinoviev and Kamenev pled guilty to the charges. 147  Harold 
Denny, who had replaced Walter Duranty as The New York Times’s primary Moscow 
correspondent, did note that the ninety-seven individuals affected by this ruling were all involved 
in the “Trotsky-Zinovieff opposition.”148 Such a comment concerning oppositionists’ roles in the 
USSR could create a conspiratorial tone surrounding the event, likely increasing the uncertainties 
of Western readers attempting to understand the complexities of the situation. The large number 
of those affected by this ruling, beyond Zinoviev and Kamenev, also indicates the widening net – 
in which many could become ensnared – of the Soviet state. However, the Western focus 
remained on the Old Bolsheviks instead of these unnamed individuals, which was a trend that 
would continue into the following years. The various trials, exiles, and executions in the 
aftermath of Kirov’s death did not end the drive against supposed counterrevolutionaries, and 
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there was an increase in arrests for such crimes throughout 1935. 149 This period would set the 
foundations for the larger government-sanctioned operations to come in subsequent years.150 
While journalists may have provided Western readers with the bulk of their news about 
the Soviet regime, the press corps was not the sole means of spreading information abroad. 
Communist parties existed in all major European and North American nations (though Germany 
had all but wiped out communist forces after the Reichstag fire), and the mid-1930s saw a move 
towards a strong unified approach between them. As such, an increased Soviet presence in the 
global sphere led to the re-emergence of the Communist International (Comintern) as a ready 
advocate for the Stalinist government, despite a perceived distance between the two organs. The 
Comintern even went so far as to send out telegrams of approval to its offices around the world 
following the mass of executions of those deemed responsible for Kirov’s assassination. 151 This 
connection meant that the various international Communist Parties based their stances 
(concerning events such as show trials) on reactions emanating from Moscow, where the 
Comintern was headquartered. An ongoing phenomenon even into the Moscow Trials, such 
vocal and widespread proclamations could also contribute to a growing ideological divide around 
the globe, despite the more inclusive outward approach of the Comintern after 1934. 152 Such 
polarizing views between these groups were not wholly new, but would be exacerbated in the 
wake of the First Moscow Trial.  
 As for the Anglo-American journalists themselves, the period immediately preceding the 
Trial of the Sixteen saw the publication of more than just newspaper articles; specifically there 
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was a rise in memoirs and other lengthy accounts of time spent in the Soviet Union. Upon 
leaving the USSR’s censorship- laden landscape, there was a newfound freedom for reporters in 
writing of their experiences abroad. Western readers also provided an interested audience willing 
to read an array of works that explored life in the Soviet Union. Walter Duranty’s I Write As I 
Please, Anna Louise Strong’s I Change Worlds: The Remaking of an American, Eugene Lyons’s 
Moscow Carrousel, and William Henry Chamberlin’s Russia’s Iron Age all provided insights 
into the daily life within a foreign nation. These particular authors had spent considerable 
amounts of time in the Soviet Union as reporters (several having been present from its earliest 
days), and they offered a great deal of firsthand knowledge.153 Although their views were far 
from uniform, their Western upbringings offered a distinct contrast from the landscape in the 
USSR that was reflected in their writings.  
The books themselves offered several interesting interpretations of an alien and 
developing nation. Perhaps the most famous, Duranty’s work came about as he increasingly 
worked outside of the Soviet Union. Although technically employed by The New York Times 
until 1940, his articles appeared less frequently after 1934. I Write As I Please provided an 
altogether positive look at the Soviet Union; it relied on Duranty’s own efforts as a journalist as 
the main source for denoting the nation’s importance. While covering its stark differences with 
the Western world, Duranty also described the fall of Zinoviev and Kamenev during the rise of 
Stalin.154 However, it seemed as though the veteran journalist was primarily focused on 
establishing his own credibility and mettle, although the book did offer a deal of insight into the 
Soviet world. Taking a more direct approach, Strong made no efforts to hide her appreciation of 
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Soviet virtues, while also alluding to a secretive society that was difficult for outsiders, and 
especially journalists, to access.155 Even though she worked in the USSR for years and advocated 
for the communist cause, there seemed to be an insurmountable distance to overcome, even for 
those who internalized Soviet ideology. Although both Lyons and Chamberlin had begun their 
careers as hopeful concerning the Soviet Union’s future, they became disenchanted during their 
years spent as journalists within the nation itself.156 While Lyons was more or less neutral in this 
publication, it was Chamberlin who adopted a more negative outlook. He focused on the poor 
standard of living for many Soviet citizens, despite the industrialization drive, as well as on the 
inability of journalists to report or even comment about certain events. 157 For some who were 
initially sympathetic towards the Soviet regime, these works were less than exemplary in their 
outlooks. The timing of their publications, all appearing in print before the outset of the Great 
Terror, means that they cannot offer firsthand knowledge on the Terror itself, nor on the First 
Moscow Trial. However, the manner in which these correspondents explained daily life in the 
Soviet Union to their readers, most often in stark contrast to Western experiences, mirrors the 
way they framed the nation as a whole. A possible reason may have been to offer context for 
their readers, specifically a means to visualize such a different culture, but such a style indicates 
the limitations of the content published by Western writers.  
 After professing their guilt in January 1935, Zinoviev and Kamenev fell off the Western 
press’s radar, receiving little serious mention until they re-emerged at the beginning of the First 
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Moscow Trial over eighteen months later. They were not, however, overlooked by the Soviet 
government. The interim period saw a move towards a larger trial, one which would charge the 
defendants with far more heinous crimes than mere “indirect association” with Kirov’s 
assassination. The NKVD, the state security apparatus that had changed its title from the OGPU 
in July 1934, led the action against counterrevolutionary elements. By June 1935, Nikolai 
Yezhov, recently elected to the USSR’s Central Committee and future leader of the NKVD, 
brought forth a far more serious case against Zinoviev and Kamenev. He charged that the two 
Old Bolsheviks were part of a wide conspiracy in the Kremlin which aimed to murder Soviet 
leaders, and accused them of “direct involvement” in the death of Kirov. 158 While not initially 
accepted by the rest of the Soviet government, Yezhov’s enthusiasm for a trial against the 
Zinovievites, as well as the Trotskyites, continued to gain momentum. In his search for elements 
involved in the Kremlin Plot of 1935, Yezhov and the NKVD apparently uncovered conspiracies 
targeting Stalin and made connections to supporters of Zinoviev (most notably Kamenev). 
Yezhov’s efforts to persecute the Old Bolsheviks became more apparent throughout 1935 and 
into 1936. Interrogations began to connect former oppositionists to larger terrorist conspiracies 
orchestrated by both Trotskyites and Zinovievites (terms used to denote the supporters of both 
men).159 It was actually the rumors of assassination plots against many prominent Soviet leaders 
that would develop into the major charge of the First Moscow Trial, although Kirov’s murder 
was presented as the only successful undertaking.160 In the end, it was Stalin himself who 
apparently spurred on Yezhov during this period, taking an explicit interest in the day-to-day 
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NKVD operations and actively issuing orders.161 The dictator’s motives for such conspiracies, 
including the Moscow Trials, remain a significant topic of speculation, but are beyond the 
purview of this work. However, one of the main takeaways is that many of these domestic 
actions were taken within the context of the ongoing conflict between Stalin and the now-exiled 
former commander of the Red Army, Leon Trotsky. 
Trotsky’s expulsion from the USSR years earlier had in no way diminished his desire to 
undermine the Stalinist state, nor, in turn, slowed the state’s efforts to silence Trotsky. 
Throughout his exile, Trotsky would make numerous claims of the regime’s inevitable demise. 
When such statements were printed in the American press, they were mostly connected to 
Stalin’s political failings, and at times given in the words of Trotsky himself. 162 Western 
newspapers took note, and published articles concerning the intertwined histories of, as well as 
the ideological divide separating, the two men.163 This ongoing threat to Stalin’s authority likely 
affected the manner in which he and his cohort acted in the months leading up to the Trial of the 
Sixteen. Continued uncertainties and fears concerning tense domestic problems and deteriorating 
international situations all factored into how the Soviet government reacted to real or perceived 
dissent within its own ranks.164 These developments connected with Trotsky’s refusal to back 
down from his position led to his disparagement in the Soviet press, which became more of a 
mainstay as time progressed. If individuals were not wholly defined by their political ideologies 
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when the Soviet Union was first established, by the mid-1930s, one’s past political allegiance or 
even personal connections could certainly return to haunt them, often with deadly consequences. 
Former oppositionists like Zinoviev, Kamenev, and especially Trotsky, became easy targets for 
caricature and vilification well before they were put on trial.165 On the ground level, this 
phenomenon was experienced through Western eyes as well, with major changes to Soviet 
society becoming more apparent as the Terror progressed. 166 The real difficulty remained in 
expressing this changing atmosphere to Western readers, especially since there was practically 
no warning for the coming trial by the correspondents. 
If Western correspondents were not blind to the conflict between Stalin and Trotsky, 
many of the other inner work ings of the Soviet state remained beyond their vision. The state’s 
decision-making while moving towards the Trial of the Sixteen, though haphazard, was not 
covered in any meaningful capacity by the Anglo-American press corps, meaning that their 
readers were equally ill- informed that such a trial was on the horizon. The New York Times 
published reports on a myriad of topics in the USSR during this period, from articles on divorce 
proceedings to rising tensions with Japan to educating peasants on the science behind a solar 
eclipse.167 While such topics obviously offered American readers some indication of daily life in 
the USSR, there was no mention of ongoing conspiracy plots involving the Old Bolsheviks who 
would soon act as the prominent defendants in the most sensational Soviet show trial to date. The 
worsening international environment (especially surrounding the rise of the Nazis in Germany) 
meant that the Soviet Union was not the sole foreign power under scrutiny in the Western press, 
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but the failure to prepare readers for an event such as the First Moscow Trial – an event that 
Western correspondents would publicize internationally – indicates a real deficiency in their 
work. In the months before the announcement of the trial, there was little written about Zinoviev 
and Kamenev, the two most well-known defendants, except an occasional reference to their 
arrests the previous year. As such, the announcement of the trial on August 14, 1936 could not 
help but act as a shocking story; it ran on the front pages of numerous North American 
newspapers.168 The absence of stories on major Soviet conspiracies or arrests in the prior months 
only added to the sense that the trial seemingly materialized out of nowhere. There was little 
time to devote to such concerns, as the entire trial was completed only eleven days after its initial 
mention in Western newspapers. 
In actuality, the Soviet government did not initiate this trial out of nowhere. Away from 
the eyes of Western correspondents, the previous months had seen an increase in NKVD 
activities preparing for just such an event. The case truly gained footing at the beginning of 1936, 
when an alleged former Trotskyite, Valentin Olberg, began implicating other Trotskyites (and 
eventually Zinovievites) in a wider conspiracy. There continues to be a great deal of intrigue 
surrounding Olberg and his role as the first defendant to confess in the Trial of the Sixteen. Some 
have made the claim that he was an NKVD agent, although that did not save him in the end. 169 
Regardless of his possible complicity in the affair, Olberg’s confession set in motion the 
preparations for the trial, moving it from an investigation into a single act to one of a wider 
conspiracy that involved sixteen men (as well as incorporating Trotsky and his son in 
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absentia).170 Despite his importance, Western correspondents never gave any indication that 
Olberg was even on their radar, with their newspapers making no mention of him until the 
announcement of the trial.  
 The NKVD was fully prepared for the First Moscow Trial by July 1936; all those 
involved had procured the necessary self- incrimination, as every defendant, to some degree, 
confessed to their supposed crimes against the Soviet state. As opposed to the high-standing 
charges of treason that affected many citizens (and would be the norm in the later trials), these 
defendants’ crimes centered on the successful assassination of Sergei Kirov in 1934, as well as 
the attempted murder of other key Soviet leaders, including Stalin himself.171 In late July 1936, a 
secret letter circulated in the Central Committee of the USSR; it was entitled “Concerning the 
terroristic activity of the Trotskyist-Zinoivievist counterrevolutionary bloc.” Building on their 
indirect complicity from January 1935, these new charges were far more serious, since they 
claimed that Zinoviev and his followers worked with Trotskyite agents in their assassination 
plots. While Yezhov penned the letter, it was Stalin who guided his hand, rewrote sections, and 
prepared both the confessions and the final verdicts of the trial.172 At an earlier date, it was even 
Stalin who had moved to increase the total number of defendants from twelve to sixteen. 173 
The turnover rate of Western journalists in Moscow (an issue with foreign correspondents 
in general) also seemed to affect recollections of outcomes in past show trials; as in previous 
trials, there were articles published in the Western press concerning the expectations of harsh 
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sentences against the accused.174 In this instance, the rhetoric actually proved to be true, while 
also creating sensational headlines. However, even though foreign correspondents jumped at the 
chance to report on the First Moscow Trial, their efforts did not always result in flawless 
reporting. For example, American press reports were often rife with spelling errors concerning 
the names of the defendants.175 On occasion, some newspapers omitted the lesser known 
defendants entirely from their stories, as there was little context to be offered about these obscure 
individuals, especially when compared to Zinoviev and Kamenev’s extensive histories within the 
Party and the establishment of the USSR.176 
It may seem harsh to seemingly deride members of the Western press for not foreseeing 
the Trial of the Sixteen, as the Soviet government’s secrecy undoubtedly made it all but 
impossible to gain the necessary information to do so. This lack of awareness is less an 
indictment of the journalists themselves (with many likely dissatisfied with their situation) as it is 
a demonstration of the shortcomings of the system which they upheld. The degree of limitation 
and censorship in the Soviet Union created an atmosphere in which individuals who were 
involved in the creation of a new nation less than two decades earlier could be found guilty of 
crimes so outrageous as to nearly defy logic. However, moments such as the First Moscow Trial 
highlight Western reporting in a different manner, namely the degree to which the free press can 
meaningfully contribute to an informed public. The calm period between Kirov’s death and the 
beginning of the trial gave little indication of the spectacle to come, either in terms of the trial 
itself or the looming Great Terror. While perhaps not a new phenomenon, the coming violence 
would prove to be of significant interest of the Western world, even after the USSR’s collapse.  
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The Case of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre (as it came to be known) took 
place from August 19 to 24, 1936. Held in the October Hall of Moscow’s Trade Union House, it 
was presided over by the President of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, 
Vasily Ulrich, who had served in such a capacity during earlier show trials. Unlike the previous, 
secretive trial of Zinoviev and Kamenev, members of the public and journalists were now invited 
to the viewing gallery. The hall was not particularly large; it was able to fit approximately 150 
Soviet citizens and 30 foreigners (including correspondents and diplomats). 177 Offering an 
interesting perspective, Harold Denny reported, before the trial began, that the dramatic elements 
amplified by show trials would be absent from the proceedings, since the guilty verdict was 
already certain.178 Such an opinion shows an evolving understanding of Soviet show trials, even 
by those not there to witness the antecedent proceedings. However, this view did not stop Denny 
and others from submitting daily reports of the trial once it got underway.  
Journalists who covered the First Moscow Trial followed the path of their predecessors, 
offering commentary focused almost entirely on the manner in which the trial progressed. 
Correspondents chose to lay out the defendants’ admissions of guilt for all their audiences to 
read. Returning to the original articles they produced offers perhaps the most significant 
indication of problems in terms of the reporting itself: North American newspapers were 
dominated by articles from the United Press (UP) and the Associated Press (AP). The two news 
wire organizations would eventually sell their copyrighted works to publications across the 
globe, but they were focused on North American audiences at this time. 179 Their pieces often ran 
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without bylines, meaning they were not attached to the name or reputation of any journalist, but 
instead read like an omniscient author was presenting the story. Such articles are, as a result, 
referenced only by their titles by historians when using them in their work. In recounting the first 
day of the trial, reporters simply laid out the narrative that was presented in court: formerly 
prominent communists and their followers had set up an elaborate conspiracy to assassinate 
current Bolshevik leaders, succeeding only with Kirov. There was some commentary on this 
“perfectly incredible story,” but such concerns were quickly set aside owing to the defendants’ 
collective desire to implicate themselves.180 Aside from this willingness to confess their apparent 
complicity, correspondents reported on the defendants’ stoic and calm demeanor as they surely 
moved towards their own executions, as well as on the wider conspiracy connections with 
Trotsky and the German Gestapo. Beyond these revelations, one of the defendants, the Trotskyite 
I.I. Reingold, also linked Karl Radek to these conspiracies in his testimony. 181 If the Soviet 
leadership had offered this fantastic series of events to foreign reporters through the creation of 
the trial, the same leadership was already planning for the next Moscow Trial, where Radek 
would be front and center as one of its primary defendants.  
The correspondents would continue to cover events as they unfolded throughout the 
duration of the trial. Over the first three days, their articles described the prosecution’s cross-
examination of the defendants and witnesses, while the final three days offered plenty of space to 
quote State Prosecutor Vyshinsky as he demonized the accused (who were also allowed to make 
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final pleas). The trial also featured morning and evening sessions, meaning that depending on 
their publication schedule, some newspapers could offer information on proceedings from the 
same day (although waiting until the next day could offer time for a more detailed article). It was 
during the second day of the trial that Zinoviev and Kamenev took the stand. As the two most 
prominent of the accused physically present in the hall (due to Trotsky’s absence), their 
testimony was necessary in order to properly demonstrate the validity of the charges, or at least 
the government’s ability to make them appear that way. Despite their longstanding histories in 
the Party and the Soviet government, both Zinoviev and Kamenev freely admitted their efforts to 
bring about Stalin’s downfall and take control of the Soviet Union. Correspondents diligently 
published their confessions, but offered nearly no critical investigation of possible motives 
behind their claims; instead, the accused were often simply taken at their word. Moving away 
from past show trials, many of which saw defendants deny their guilt when on the witness stand, 
there were no such recantations during the testimonies of Zinoviev or Kamenev. The newspaper 
articles gave no indication that the two most prominent defendants were telling anything but the 
honest truth when recounting plots to murder their former allies and seize control of the 
nation.182  
As Olberg and Reingold spun their tales of conspiracy and betrayal, Zinoviev and 
Kamenev made no efforts to deny their guilt; indeed, the trial must have seemed to be going off 
without a hitch by the Soviet leadership’s standards. However, there was still some resistance to 
be found in Ivan Smirnov, formerly of the Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet of the 
National Economy. He did not recant on a previous confession, but refuted several of the claims 
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against him, specifically surrounding his inclusion in the more violent aspects of the plot. In 
response, it was not only the prosecutor and judges who derided his protestations, but the other 
defendants as well. It was also noted that the trial was unlike those typically experienced in an 
American courtroom, as the majority of the defendants were not attempting to proclaim their 
innocence, but seemingly making every effort to ensure their own conviction. 183 Utilizing 
comparisons with Western courts provided reporters with a means of making sense of the Soviet 
experience for their explicitly Western audiences.  
Despite articles detailing the trial and the demeanors of its defendants, doubts as to its 
overall validity were raised, though never in a prominent fashion. The New York Times included 
mention of the “fantasy” that was the First Moscow Trial, wherein the unnamed author 
undermines both the proceedings and Harold Denny’s reporting, but the piece was buried in the 
paper’s later pages.184 Denny’s more neutral front page coverage could not be balanced out by a 
small, unaccredited article hidden within the confines of the newspaper. The dramatic moments 
offered by the trial seemingly made for great news, and, when combined with the difficulties in 
arguing against the newspaper’s own reporter on the scene, there was little to be done with such 
misgivings. There was also no consensus about the trial among the Western correspondents, as 
elements such as Zinoviev’s claims concerning Trotsky’s role in the conspiracy were displayed 
as either active or passive depending on the personal opinions of the individual writers. 185 Such 
conflicting articles could only add to the confusing nature of the trial and its explanation abroad.  
As Zinoviev and Kamenev had both concluded their testimonies, the following day 
offered less to entice readers. Although articles continued to flow, they did not appear as 
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frequently on the front pages. In actuality, the intrigue was far from over. Aside from Radek, 
other Old Bolsheviks were included in the defendants’ statements, leading to further inquiry on 
the part of Western reporters. Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky, Stalin’s former Rightist allies, 
were now being investigated for supposed links to the conspiracy. There was some 
acknowledgement that many of those indicated had been prominent leaders of the Soviet Union, 
but little developed on that front, and the news articles conveyed seemingly no signals that 
further trials were to come.186 These new details aside, the trial progressed into the third day with 
some fantastic developments. Stories of secret codes hidden in classic novels, clandestine 
meetings held in foreign hotels, and further connections to Nazi Germany added to the overall 
atmosphere of intrigue. Contradictory answers given by the defendants resulted in their derision 
by the prosecution and the audience, which was a method perfected during previous trials, rather 
than in a sense that their testimonies had been fabricated.187 The Washington Post did include a 
small piece undercutting the sequence of events (just as its competitor The New York Times had 
the previous day); the article questioned the degree to which the defendants refused to actually 
defend themselves, but no author was credited with the piece. 188 While such articles may serve to 
create a confusing picture for readers, there is little to suggest newspaper editors held them in 
high esteem, especially since they were relegated to the newspapers’ later pages. The better 
known and apparently reputable Associated Press continued to report on the trial as if it were 
completely sincere within the same newspaper issue. There was also the matter of the 
                                                 
186
 Haro ld Denny, Special to The New York Times, “6 Soviet Leaders Now Under Inquiry,” The New York Times 
(Aug. 22, 1936), 3. Georgy Piatakov and Niko lai Uglanov were also mentioned in the art icle; neither would survive 
many years beyond this point. 
187
 “Reveal Code Used by Trotzky Forces,” Marshfield News-Herald (Aug. 21, 1936), 1, 4; and “Soviet Judges 
Laugh at ‘Dime Novel’ Plotters,” The Washington Post (Aug. 22, 1936), 7. The novel was The Arabian Nights, but 
the actual code was “forgotten” by the defendant Holtzman. 
188
 “Behind the Soviet Trial,”  The Washington Post (Aug. 22, 1936), 6. A similar kind of ed itorial can be seen in 
“Another Soviet ‘Trial,’” The Decatur Herald (Aug 22, 1936), 4, which wrote that the only chance for the 
defendants to escape with their lives was to fully admit their guilt.  
  
Gentry   61  
“indispensible evidence” mentioned in the article,189 which misled readers as there was no 
substantial or damning proof aside from the defendants’ own testimonies.  
The fourth day of the trial had some breaking news directly related to the previous 
several days of reporting: the suicide of Mikhail Tomsky on August 22, 1936. After his 
implication in the conspiracy plots laid out by the defendants of the Trial of the Sixteen, he chose 
to take his own life rather than being subjected to the treatment that was soon to plague his 
colleagues. Tellingly, there was no real investigation of his motivations beyond mention of his 
connection to the ongoing conspiracy investigations.190 Problems within the story were rampant: 
the Associated Press article (when printed in The New York Times) indicated Tomsky was a 
decade older than his actual age, a misprint that seemingly went unnoticed; in a similar vein, the 
United Press report utilized the Soviet government newspaper Pravda, a rather dubious source, 
to support its claims about Tomsky’s demeanor.191 
Tomsky’s suicide was not the only news of the day, as there was also a chance for State 
Prosecutor Vyshinsky to orate to the audience on the moral failings of the defendants. “Mad dogs 
[who] must be shot” was the phrase that appeared again and again in newspapers, likely as it 
made for a poignant tagline. The defendants were also portrayed as more emotional than before, 
with some even being said to have cried as they expressed no desire for mercy from the court. 192 
Harold Denny did pen an interesting article which labelled Zinoviev and Kamenev as “pawns,” 
with Trotsky as the main target of the Soviet government. In doing so, he reinvigorated previous 
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notions which viewed the antagonism between Stalin and Trotsky as a battle of paramount 
importance. However, through this continued focus on the Bolshevik elite, there was no 
indication of the far more widespread purge to come – one which would spread far further than 
the former oppositionists who fought against Stalin during his rise to power.193 
There seemed to be a general consensus that reporters chose to skip writing about the 
defendants’ final pleas in order to focus on the decision of the court: guilty verdicts for all the 
defendants, with their executions by firing squad set to be carried out within three days. The 
sixteen men were also given the right to appeal their sentences before the executions. Few 
correspondents indicated any real surprise by the court’s verdict, which took only eight hours of 
deliberation to be reached, as they had always maintained that such a decision was inevitable in 
their writings on the trial. Interestingly, the reporters also omitted writing on the second to last 
day of the trial and move right into the court’s verdict. Every defendant accepted the decision, 
with the exception of Smirnov, even offering speeches affirming their acceptance of their fates; 
only two of the accused asked for clemency (V. Olberg and N. Lurye), with the rest accepting 
their sentences without hesitation. One telling description of their collective attitudes, especially 
those offered by Zinoviev and Kamenev, was that they were “painfully embarrassing.” Reporters 
also described the Soviet public’s anticipation of the trial’s end, with many in Moscow 
remaining updated on the proceedings, mirroring the actions seen in earlier show trials.  
In terms of resistance to the charges, the International Federation of Trade Unions and the 
Labour and Socialist International, among others, had made appeals seeking mercy for the 
defendants. Correspondents noted there was little chance such an effort would have ever been 
successful, since the decision to execute the accused was planned beforehand, and such appeals 
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could only strengthen the Soviet government’s resolve. The end of such a dramatic trial, called 
“the most notable in the history of the Soviet Union and perhaps the most important political trial 
ever held anywhere,” did not result in any unexpected sensations beyond the complete 
willingness of the defendants to ensure their own guilt.194 The Moscow correspondents had been 
conditioned into understanding these trials as contained events; they did not foresee the wider 
and more deadly implications that would soon follow. As in previous show trials, the verdict was 
understood as unavoidable from the outset. However, what came next was far more shocking.  
The Trial of the Sixteen was not held to the same standards as trials conducted in other 
instances, as it was not subjected to the post-Kirov decree that ended the right to appeal a given 
sentence. Since that appeal still remained for the defendants, it may have seemed likely that the 
saga would continue, as previous trials had not led to the deaths of many defendants, even upon 
being found guilty.195 That was not to be the case here. The following day, August 25, many 
newspapers published news that the Soviet government had carried out the death sentences after 
an immediate denial of the defendants’ appeals. Confusion was rampant as to why the usual 
seventy-two hour timeframe was ignored, but in the end did not really result in more than a day’s 
worth of news; now that the defendants were dead, the public spectacle was over. 196 The death of 
the accused, however, indicated a massive shift from previous trials, where those found guilty 
were often jailed or deported, but this development was seemingly lost on Western 
correspondents, again indicating a failure to understand the moment’s deeper significance.  
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Instead, it was Leon Trotsky’s refusal to stay quiet in the face of the charges laid against 
him that now offered reporters a developing story they deemed to be worth covering. Trotsky’s 
response that he was ready to face these allegations allowed for an extension of the spectacle for 
the time being.197 Trotsky’s efforts would eventually result in an inquiry led by the Dewey 
Commission, which took place in Mexico the following year. Harold Denny, one of the most 
consistent reporters of the First Moscow Trial, looked to maintain the intriguing saga by 
reporting on Trotsky’s words, although he still utilized Izvestia and Pravda as his sources of 
information.198 Soon enough, he and his counterparts would move on to different stories, and the 
entire affair would slowly fade, at least until the next trial.  
It remains difficult to believe that this entire trial took place over less than a single week, 
although of course it necessitated a significantly longer period of planning. However, that 
planning was not known to the correspondents (and seemingly not sought out), and therefore not 
to readers abroad; hence, the trial was presented as though it sprang out of nowhere. If front page 
coverage within newspapers indicates the importance allocated to major events, then the First 
Moscow Trial was given ample opportunity to capture readers’ attention. The New York Times 
published front page stories on four of the trial’s six total days, with commentary of some kind 
every day.199 That a major newspaper would devote such significant space to the trial’s coverage 
indicates the significance associated with the entire affair, or at least an awareness that its readers 
would be interested in the topic. Such front page coverage was not limited to major outlets like 
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The New York Times, as other newspapers followed suit.  After the conclusion of the trial, the 
remaining parts of the story fell off the front page. For instance, Denny’s report on the trial’s 
fallout in an international context, appearing a mere five days after reporting on the defendants’ 
executions, was relegated to a review section deep in the issue’s contents. While continuing to 
accept the trial at face value, this article also marked one of the final times that the First Moscow 
Trial was referred to at all in the publication.200 Similar trends followed in many other 
newspapers, with references to the accused and the trial decreasing significantly and rapidly, 
despite the frenzy of the preceding week. In the end, the First Moscow Trial managed to 
disappear from the Western news cycle nearly as quickly as it had appeared.  
As mentioned above, while major American newspapers, perhaps most notably The New 
York Times, could afford special reporters stationed around the globe, many smaller regional or 
local papers needed to purchase these articles or reports from other news services. While Denny 
worked exclusively for The New York Times, editors from newspapers with fewer financial 
means were forced to find coverage of such major stories elsewhere; the United Press or the 
Associated Press were two of the most prominent organizations such newspapers could use in 
order to stay relevant on international events. In covering events for the UP, Norman B. Deuel’s 
words appeared in newspapers all around the United States, including such disparate newspapers 
as Oregon’s Bend Bulletin, Pennsylvania’s Evening Times, and New York’s Times Herald, 
among others. His primary competitor, Charles P. Nutter of the AP, would see his words in 
Alton, Illinois’s Alton Evening Telegraph, Oakland’s Oakland Tribune, and Indiana’s Indiana 
Gazette, among others. A common difficulty involved in utilizing these press services was that 
one had to trust in the correspondents’ reporting; there was simply no way for smaller papers to 
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verify their contents. For better or worse, the reach of such a journalist, who worked for an 
international news agency that sold its copyrighted works to others, could be extensive. Even 
newspapers that boasted syndicated news operations of their own had the option of utilizing 
these news association services’ reports when they were deemed appropriate or necessary.201 
 The United States-based news agencies certainly seemed to have strong control over the 
spread of information during the First Moscow Trial, if not the larger interwar period. Canadian 
newspapers such as Toronto’s Globe (precursor to The Globe and Mail), Ottawa’s Ottawa 
Journal, Winnipeg’s Winnipeg Tribune, and Nanaimo’s Nanaimo Daily News were forced to 
make use of copyrighted Associated Press articles. On August 20, the latter three of these 
newspapers used identical material on their own front pages, albeit with different titles.202 The 
following day, The Globe relayed on the same information in a more drawn out article, with the 
quotations and conclusions as essentially equivalent (although the AP was not given mention). 203 
In Britain, the London-based Times did not follow the same course as its American and Canadian 
counterparts, as the newspaper seemingly refused to give the trial front page access at all. Since 
the paper did not have a correspondent in Moscow to cover the trial, its editors were forced to 
use articles supplied by Reuters or the London Press Exchange.204 The tense situation between 
the major European powers in the interwar period may explain the difference between coverage 
for the British Times and North American papers. The distinction was made evident through the 
Times’s continued use of correspondents in Riga instead of those actually residing in Moscow 
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and who were actually witnessing the trial firsthand. There was an ongoing delay in their timing 
of their coverage; for instance, publication of the verdict came one day later than the North 
American newspapers. News even reached Australia, which seemingly took its cues from 
London (specifically from the Daily Telegraph), although there was little sustained attention 
offered to the stories, at least far less than found in North America.205 
What is particularly startling in a close analysis of the contemporary news accounts is 
that the majority of stories in North America came from only a handful of sources. Few reporters 
seemingly attended the First Moscow Trial. As the story unfolded, many articles in American 
newspapers were supplied by either the United Press or the Associated Press; at times, these 
were attributed to either Deuel or Nutter, but this was far from a common occurrence. Due to the 
consolidated and powerful reach of these two news services, many newspapers were forced to 
print the same articles as their competitors. They simply could not afford to send their own 
reporters to Moscow. Even major newspapers like The New York Times or The Chicago Daily 
Tribune made use of these news agencies, whose reach now began to challenge their European 
counterparts.206 An ongoing difficulty when historians try to assess responsibility for spreading 
the news was that reporters were often not credited by name when articles from the United Press, 
the Associated Press, or Reuters appeared in newspapers. 207 In other words, the views of 
individual correspondents were eclipsed by the editorial line established by the larger press 
services they represented. As such, the increasing competitive business interests behind the 
spread of the news continued to dominate the landscape. This condensed field also meant that the 
factual errors of one correspondent could be replicated in many newspapers and spread to 
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countless readers across North America, or even beyond. More than simply blaming the reporters 
themselves for the shortcomings of their work, a study of coverage concerning the First Moscow 
Trial offers a greater understanding of how this media landscape offered people access to the 
news (if not the complete picture), and how it left “original news-gathering” by the wayside.208 
Perhaps one of the reasons why the Moscow Trials hold such an influential position in 
the study of Soviet history, at least in its earlier days, was that the Western world was seemingly 
blind to their origins. Our current understandings of the Soviet government’s inner workings 
aside, the preparation for the public spectacle that was the First Moscow Trial did little to alter 
the correspondents’ approaches to reporting the event. In the end, there was only an increase in 
the international confusion surrounding the trial and, indeed, the entirety of Soviet political life. 
The previous show trials could not have prepared foreign audiences for the degree to whic h the 
Stalinist government would soon turn on its own people, and the nature of the news cycle, where 
stories can disappear in an instant, did little to help matters.  
Targeting the Old Bolsheviks at this juncture may not have been the motivating force 
behind the more widespread purges to come, but the public spectacle and ongoing conspiracies 
set in place did pave the way for future trials. The failure of Western reporters to really breach 
the Soviet sphere of secrecy both compliments the Soviet system and condemns the 
correspondents’ efforts; it demonstrates a reactive approach to spreading information to readers 
back home. The lack of indication in Anglo-American presses that the First Moscow Trial would 
occur at all did little to halt their correspondents from leading the charge to cover the 
proceedings once they were announced. In terms of Soviet show trials, foreign correspondents 
chose to view the spectacle in a supposedly neutral manner, and their articles could even appear 
on the prestigious front page. The shortcomings of the Western press corps in terms of truly 
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understanding the Soviet Union and its inner workings remained beyond the reporters’ 
consideration. However, Western correspondents were not the only ones interested in spreading 
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4 – The Aftermath, or: How the West Was (Left) Wondering 
 In terms of the positioning Anglo-American newspapers within the grand scheme of 
spreading information, it is important to note that the degree to which individual publications can 
affect public opinion is not wholly known. Despite their “elite” status, even newspapers such as 
The New York Times can never enjoy complete readership across the United States. In turn, local 
papers have a different problem, since they are forced to utilize news wire services that provide 
what can now be understood as woefully limited and insufficient coverage of certain major 
international events, at least in terms of offering any meaningful scrutiny.209 The fairly short 
news cycle surrounding the events of the First Moscow Trial did not end the string of 
controversies that arose after the verdict was carried out. Aside from the newspapers already 
discussed in this work, other mediums existed to ensure the ongoing issues were not forgotten as 
quickly. Foregoing the immediacy of newspaper coverage, these alternative means were 
undertaken in order to sway public opinion surrounding the trial in the following weeks and 
months; such efforts continued even as the Soviet Union moved towards more show trials. Aside 
from books or magazine articles, these pieces often appeared in pamphlet form, and therefore 
offered more space to formulate an argument than a newspaper article alone. Their publication 
also served as a means of income for both publishing houses and authors. 210 Such works had the 
potential to reach a wide readership, as well as have greater longevity than an article in a daily 
newspaper. Considering these publications, which appeared in the aftermath of the trial, can shed 
                                                 
209
 John Maxwell Hamilton, Journalism’s Roving Eye: A History of American Foreign News Reporting  (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University, 2009), 8. 
210
 For example, D.N. Pritt’s At the Moscow Trial (New York: “Soviet Russia Today,” 1937) cost five cents, Sam 
Darcy’s An Eye-Witness at the Wreckers’ Trial (New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1937) cost ten cents, the 
American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky’s World Voices on the Moscow Trials: A Compilation from 
the Labour and Liberal Press of the World (New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1936) cost fifteen cents, and Francis 
Heisler’s The First Two Moscow Trials: Why?  (Chicago: Socialist Party USA, 1937) cost twenty-five cents. 
  
Gentry   71  
light on the continuing saga of the conflicting sources of information that existed for Western 
audiences. 
 At this moment, it is necessary to note that similar difficulties exist between utilizing 
newspapers articles and the contents of pamphlets or magazines; namely, the degree to which 
they really affected public perception. The mere publication of such works does not equate to a 
definite weight or influence emanating from their pages. It is not altogether realistic to assume 
massive readership concerning a single event such as a trial in a foreign nation, or even a wide 
audience beyond those who already subscribed to a particular ideological opinion. However, it 
would also be a disservice to completely ignore the reality of their existence, which in itself 
indicates an ongoing (and oftentimes volatile) debate surrounding the trial and its verdict. There 
are many potential uses for such types of sources, although it remains imperative to be aware of 
the dangers associated with subscribing these individual voices to popular opinion. As such, their 
use has the power to inform and even to complicate the landscape surrounding the shaping of 
Western public opinion in the aftermath of the First Moscow Trial.  
 The Soviet government persisted in advocating for its version of the proceedings 
internationally. The Comintern, now with Georgy Dimitrov at its head, stood ready and willing 
to spread the Stalinist interpretation of the trial; its Executive Committee (ECCI) immediately 
sent messages to the Communist Parties in both Britain and France. The ECCI wanted to ensure 
they followed the chosen version of events, while maintaining a heightened awareness of the 
necessity to battle Trotskyism in all its forms (especially considering how subscribing to that 
ideology was now equated to fascism). The explicit need to mention that members of the foreign 
press were allowed to view the trial itself was a major indication of the trial’s increasing 
international context, and foreign CPs were ordered to “inform public opinion as broadly as 
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possible.”211 As opposed to the reactionary position of the Nazis in the wake of the Reichstag fire 
trial, or even the preceding show trials in the USSR itself, the Soviet regime made certain to get 
ahead on directing public opinion in this instance.212 The Trial of the Sixteen was therefore far 
from a self-contained event, especially as foreign correspondents were used in order to spread 
word of the proceedings and its overall verdict. Earl Browder, head of the Communist Party of 
the United States, received instructions to publish responses to the trial in the pro-Soviet Daily 
Worker, as well as “all [other] Communist press.”213 While the Comintern’s efforts may have 
bolstered the confidence of its Western subsidiaries, the same cannot be said for international 
socialist groups (such as the Labour and Socialist International) As such, these rising differences 
of opinion resulted in a more combative environment and a somewhat isolated Moscow. 214 An 
important note is that two defendants of the trial, Fritz David and Moses Lurye, worked for the 
Comintern at certain points in their careers. Hence, the zeal with which the ECCI pushed the 
Stalinist interpretation of the trial to the international CPs may well have been to undercut any 
suspicions against the organization as a whole.215 
 Perhaps the most important document to appear in the wake of the trial was the report of 
the court proceedings, which was entitled “The Case of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist 
Centre.” While larger than a standard pamphlet, the publication stood as a record of the trial’s 
events, and it was the Soviet government itself (via the People’s Commissariat of Justice) that 
initiated the document’s publication, condoning its circulation at home and abroad. Shortly after 
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the trial’s end, the world had access to a series of translated versions, including English, which 
clearly laid out the charges of terrorism and the assassination efforts undertaken by the 
accused.216 The overall distribution efforts indicated how the Soviet government still demanded 
the establishment of a common interpretation of the trial. Overall, much of the content mirrored 
the more cursory newspaper coverage during the trial itself; the sections of the report were 
divided between the trial sessions, just as journalists offered reports of each day’s events. These 
pages covered many of the same instances and moments as the foreign correspondents, albeit in 
greater detail. Perhaps the most striking example is State Prosecutor Vyshinsky’s fiery 
proclamation that the “dogs gone mad be shot–every one of them” retained its prominence as the 
final words of his speech.217 Such a turn of phrase was evidently too much for either Soviet 
publishers or Western reporters to ignore.  
A particularly interesting aspect of the report was the amount of space designated to the 
final pleas of the defendants. The prosecution was given significantly more pages overall in 
which to lay out the alleged conspiracies undertaken by the accused, who apparently made little 
(if any) effort to deny their guilt.218 There is no real indication of the particular mannerisms of 
the individual defendants as they responded to questions or offered their final pleas; instead, the 
document offered more of a summary of the events rather than a transcription of the entire affair. 
In the end, the declarations of the defendants that were included served only to further 
incriminate them. Based on the report alone, the verdict could hardly be questioned; the guilt of 
all sixteen men was laid out for the world to see and left little to the imagination in terms of 
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nuance or doubt.219 Based on this knowledge, those who would eventually publish reactions 
against the court proceedings would oftentimes focus on the manner in which the defendants 
acted as the trial unfolded, as opposed to focusing on the content of their words alone.  
Despite its frequent use in scholarly works concerning the Moscow Trials, the report was 
not a verbatim transcript, but rather quotations taken from the trial (as opposed to a reproduction 
of the entire proceedings).220 This fact is somewhat clear in the document itself, although the 
possibility of altering the trial account could pass unnoticed. There is also the indisputable notion 
that the specific mannerisms of the defendants are lost within the pages of such a report; the 
accused are given almost no voice beyond words that incriminated them in a widespread 
conspiracy. The abridged nature of the defendants’ final pleas indicates the minimal capacity that 
was given to their words. Another potential impact of the report was the possibility offered in 
terms of circumventing any detracting statements from third parties intent on denouncing the 
trial as a whole. There was obviously no indication in the report that torture or any such means 
were used to garner the confessions; by a contemporary understanding, the report simply offers 
an indication of the Soviet government’s level of fear as it sought desperately to control the 
resulting interpretations. The trial therefore ac ted to showcase the results of the defendants’ 
alleged crimes to both national and international audiences. 221 While there were no protests 
within the USSR, owing perhaps to fear and Party discipline, the reach of the Soviet government 
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could not readily extend beyond its borders.222 One way to alleviate this pressure was to rely on 
the Western observers who were allowed access to the trial. Soviet leaders must have been 
satisfied with that plan when some who were actually present at the trial accepted the 
proceedings and the ultimate verdict as a certainty. 
 One of the most prominent individuals fanning the flames of controversy was Denis 
Nowell Pritt, a British Member of Parliament and barrister. Pritt turned away from his 
Conservative roots by joining the Labour Party in 1918, by his own definition moving “from 
right to left.”223 Also a prominent lawyer, he was voted into Parliament in late 1935. In August, 
1936, he found himself in the Soviet Union in time for the First Moscow Trial. By his account, 
his arrival and the commencement of what he refers to as the “Zinoviev trial” was nothing more 
than a coincidence. Not believing that it would cause such controversy, he later claimed to have 
originally planned not to attend, only doing so at the behest of his wife. Even obtaining a ticket 
supposedly proved to be an ordeal. Upon speaking to the journalists present at the trial, he 
concluded that most felt as he did, specifically that the trial was fair and that the defendants were 
guilty (even though their coverage was politically inclined to undermine that viewpoint). Indeed, 
it was in response to the British press reports that Pritt undertook work on The Zinoviev Trial, a 
pamphlet in which he planned to “combat the [ongoing] slander campaign” against the USSR. 224 
Building on the cables he sent to the London News Chronicle as the trial took place, this work 
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would prove to be a major influence to both those who supported and those who stood in 
opposition to the show trial through its unwavering adherence to the Soviet line of thought.225 
Within The Zinoviev Trial’s pages, Pritt defends the overall proceedings and the court’s 
verdict. His most explicit argument centers on the confessions of the defendants as elements of 
the utmost importance in establishing their guilt. He utilizes considerable space laying out the 
argument that the defendants were made aware of the strong case against them and they 
subsequently chose to admit their guilt instead of fighting for a lost cause. Through a comparison 
of the Soviet and British legal systems, the author attempts to show to the reader that openly 
confessing to such transgressions was not an uncommon occurrence. In his opinion, there was 
nothing that indicated increased measures (such as torture) were used to garner the 
confessions.226 Pritt bases a good deal of his insight on his own experiences, mentioning his 
previous connections with Soviet police officials and the fact that he actually witnessed the trial 
itself. By his own account, the defendants could not have lied, or he would have recognized such 
an act during the trial. While admitting the incredibly personal nature of his understanding of the 
trial, Pritt chooses not to discount his own observations. 227 His high degree of confidence in his 
own opinions gives the resulting pamphlet a platform on which to reinforce his position, albeit 
based on the individual and biased beliefs of one man (although it does not claim otherwise). It 
must be said that such a quality was not solely limited to Pritt’s work, as detractors of the trial 
followed a similar path, likely due to the secretive nature of the Soviet government.  
Pritt employs a rather sardonic style throughout his work, often asking rhetorical or 
sarcastic questions of the reader. However, there are moments in which he appears more affected 
                                                 
225
 See American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky, World Voices on the Moscow Trials: A Compilation 
from the Labour and Liberal Press of the World (New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1936), 43. The footnote on the 
same page indicates that Pritt’s writings were also reprinted in the New York-based Daily Worker. 
226
 D.N. Pritt, The Zinoviev Trial (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1936), 5-12. 
227
 Pritt, The Zinoviev Trial, 11-15, 20. 
  
Gentry   77  
by the controversies surrounding the trial. He aims specific criticism at the telegram sent by the 
Labour and Socialist International (successor of the Second International) and the International 
Federation of Trade Unions. The message was sent to the Council of People’s Commissars of the 
USSR and attempted to ensure the trial was held in a proper manner and that the defendants had 
access to counsel, among other provisions. Pritt appears to have taken personal offense to the 
telegram and moves away from his previous style into a spirited and somewhat emotional 
defense of the entire Soviet legal system.228 Instead of emphasizing the trial in question, he used 
its proceedings as a means of indicating his support for the entire Soviet Union. As such, Pritt ’s 
primary focus was broader than a single trial, which may account for his choice not to list all the 
defendants, as he opted instead to remain focused on the most well-known of the accused.229  
 Aside from his unrelenting defence of the trial, a major point of interest concerns how 
Pritt claims that the sudden rush to defend the Old Bolshevik defendants on trial was “a little 
comic,” in the sense that those who did so would have readily smeared those same defendants if 
it suited their goal of undercutting the USSR’s reputation.230 While the entire pamphlet works to 
justify the First Moscow Trial, there is some validity in such a statement. The trial was made into 
more than an effort to judge sixteen individuals; it grew into a defense or condemnation of the 
entire Soviet Union. The hypocrisy of those individuals who now chose to adamantly defend the 
accused (after never having done so in the past) does seem somewhat comical in retrospect.  
Pritt’s position as both a barrister and an MP deserves at least a measure of respect in 
terms of his ability to influence an audience, especially one not familiar with the Soviet legal 
system. He also attended the trial, thereby lending his words somewhat more credence than those 
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who judged the proceedings from afar. By his own account, The Zinoviev Trial was translated 
into many languages over the following year, in a similar fashion to the trial transcript. It was 
republished in the United States in 1937, under the title At the Moscow Trial with no clear 
changes to its contents (although the new title again signified the importance of physically 
attending the trial). Pritt’s contributions would continue and consistently lend themselves to the 
pro-Soviet narrative.231 However, any hope that the matter would be closed upon the pamphlet’s 
publication were proven futile, with hotly contested debate continuing for years afterwards. 232 
Numerous pamphlets with starkly opposing views soon appeared in circulation, indicating the 
ongoing controversy surrounding the trial. Altogether, these efforts complicated the overall 
landscape, especially for readers who were not so emotionally invested in the establishment of a 
grand and indisputable narrative.  
 The Communist Party of Great Britain soon financed its own response to the trial. Penned 
by W.G. Shepherd, the pamphlet completely conformed to the position of the Soviet 
government, defending the trial and verdict, as well as claiming that the defendants’ (and 
especially Trotsky’s) lack of confidence in the revolutionary spirit of the masses was the reason 
for their traitorous ways.233 Such a publication exemplifies the extent of Pritt’s influence, as 
Shepherd defers to the MP and barrister’s knowledge of Soviet law in lieu of offering his own 
interpretation. There was also a much more visceral tone to the work than in Pritt’s response; 
Shepherd seemed to relish the opportunity to denigrate the defendants, despite all having been 
executed by this point. Despite his indignation, one moment of note involves the author 
mistaking the name of one of the defendants, perhaps due to the hasty efforts to ensure rapid 
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publication.234 The pamphlet also offers a slight addition to Pritt’s cryptic reference to the sudden 
repute some members of the British press offered to men such as Zinoviev and Kamenev. 
Shepherd considers this new outlook as another means to promote an anti-Soviet position, and 
maintains that the defendants were once lumped into the same group as Stalin. He charged that 
these opposing elements were using the trial in order to support their previously established 
positions against the Soviet Union,235 all the while committing himself to the exact same outlook 
based on his support for the USSR. Overall, the short pamphlet seemed to fit perfectly with the 
outlook adopted by the Comintern, which was disseminated among the many Communist Parties 
spread across the world. 
There was no lack for contrasting views that attempted to quickly respond to the First 
Moscow Trial; the authors of such works believed that the proceedings were a conspiracy set up 
by the Stalinist government. The Austrian socialist Friedrich Adler, mentioned in Pritt’s work 
(by his actions and not by his name),236 soon published his own response to the trial. Entitled The 
Witchcraft Trial in Moscow, Adler’s pamphlet singled out numerous elements that he felt 
merited intense scrutiny and criticism. However, Adler adopts a stricter tone and immediately 
called the published report of the proceedings a “propaganda pamphlet.” The author attempts to 
distance both himself and his organization from the politics of the defendants, most notably 
Zinoviev and Trotsky, by citing ideological differences spanning over the preceding decades.237  
As Secretary of the Labour and Socialist International, he provided a view that greatly 
opposed that of an individual that had attacked the organization’s efforts, namely D.N. Pritt. 
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While perhaps reacting to Pritt’s criticism about suddenly altered opinions concerning the 
accused, there is no indication that Adler glorifies Zinoviev and the other defendants or attempts 
to portray them as heroic martyrs. Such a connection to Pritt is not assumed, as the author spends 
a considerable portion of the pamphlet responding to The Zinoviev Trial in detail. Adler does not 
consider that merely witnessing the trial in person is enough to support claims of its legitimacy. 
In particular, he raises concerns about what are considered to be problematic comparisons 
between Soviet and British courts, as well as the validity of the given confessions. Adler believes 
that an entire defense that considers the confessions as legitimate falls apart if even one 
falsehood is uncovered. In this case, that falsehood concerns the Hotel Bristol in Copenhagen, 
where the accused Holtzman supposedly met Trotsky’s son Lev Sedov in 1932. However, the 
hotel itself had been demolished in 1917, and was never rebuilt, obviously making such a 
meeting impossible.238 By demonstrating such a clear falsehood in the testimony of one of the 
defendants, Adler attempts to demonstrate the weak nature of both the case and those who 
defend the whole trial. 
There was an interesting connection between Adler and the Soviet purge trials, which 
featured attempted assassinations among the defendants’ alleged list of crimes, as he had carried 
out the assassination of Austrian Minister-President Count Karl Von Stürgkh in 1916 (as a 
protest to the Von Stürgkh’s actions at the time). Although Adler was eventually amnestied after 
the First World War, he considered his use of terroristic violence as a justified reaction. 
However, his justification of terrorism is not extended to the USSR, which means that he does 
not support the alleged actions of the defendants. At the same time, he continues to condemn the 
proceedings of the First Moscow Trial.239 Thus, he is in the rather engaging position of 
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disparaging the trial, but not the socialist nation as a whole. Adler makes significant use of 
historical context in order to demonstrate the legal failings within the Soviet Union to the reader, 
as well as to indicate that the Labour and Socialist International provides a viable alternative. 
Citing earlier show trials, he claims that there was never really any evidence provided by the 
prosecution to indicate the guilt of the accused, and that the prosecution solely relied on the use 
of confessions.240 Overall, it seems as though the pamphlet was designed as more of a 
reactionary defense of the telegram the organization had sent to Moscow during the trial, 
although it included serious research that was used to discredit the proceedings. However, there 
is a call for the use of proper measures in political trials and a sustained effort against fascism, 
the practices of which Adler connects to those within the Soviet Union. While he does admit the 
success of the USSR under Stalin in terms of ending capitalism and mobilizing workers, he also 
refuses to stop criticizing the shortcomings in terms of individual freedom. 241 The existence of a 
socialist nation that was also a growing global power may have accounted for Adler’s refusal to 
wholly discount the Soviet structure, as he remains primarily fixated upon the failings of its legal 
system. His efforts in regard to undercutting the trial, but not the entire Soviet Union under 
Stalin, were not shared by all.  
The American Marxist theorist Max Shachtman also published a response to the First 
Moscow Trial. As both a critic of Stalin and associate of Trotsky, Shachtman uses his work, 
entitled Behind the Moscow Trial, as a means of attacking the verdict and, by extension, the 
whole Soviet system. He differs in that regard from Adler, who claimed not to have “any 
particular sympathy” for Trotsky.242 While initially noting the alarming speed from the trial’s 
announcement in the press to its verdict being carried out, he soon transitions into his major 
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claim that the First Moscow Trial “was the result of the biggest frame-up known in history.”243 
While such a statement may seem ostentatious, it sets the tone for the dramatic conspiracy 
Shachtman outlines throughout the publication; however, unlike the conspiracy laid at the 
defendants’ feet, the narrative in this instance focuses on how the accused Old Bolsheviks were 
set up as scapegoats in service to the Soviet government. The trial acted as a way to ensure Stalin 
remained in power, since it served to bolster his standing in both national and international 
contexts.244 Shachtman systematically moves through the proceedings, citing the complete lack 
of damning evidence, as well as the many contradictions offered forth in terms of specific timing 
and conspiracy plots laid out by the defendants, despite the abridged nature of available records. 
He also comes to the defense of Trotsky, who was the ultimate “target of the trial,” and discounts 
the efforts of the defendants to vilify the exiled revolutionary. 245 There is no explicit mention of 
Shachtman’s connection to Trotsky, whom he had known for years before the initial publication 
of Behind the Moscow Trial. 
Shachtman offers significant space to consider questions about the incredible nature of 
the accusations and the alleged goals of the conspiracy. In one of the more prominent examples, 
he demands to know how individuals with decades spent fighting for the socialist cause could 
suddenly reverse their ideologies to such a degree that they would then support both fascism and 
terrorism.246 The author’s effort in this regard, aside from offering a dramatic condemnation of 
the entire affair, undercuts the Soviet goal of creating a grand narrative in which the defendants’ 
guilt is beyond question. Aside from advocating this alternative perspective, Shachtman also 
sows the seeds of wider conspiracy by claiming that rational people simply could not believe the 
                                                 
243
 Max Shachtman, Behind the Moscow Trial (New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1936), 7-9. 
244
 Shachtman, Behind the Moscow Trial, 115-119. 
245
 Shachtman, Behind the Moscow Trial, 23-25, 66-67. 
246
 Shachtman, Behind the Moscow Trial, 14-15. 
  
Gentry   83  
confessions, as well as by suggesting the idea that the lesser-known defendants were planted by 
the NKVD in order to ensure the success of the trial. 247 In other words, while denying the 
conspiracy laid out by the trial report, Shachtman instead weaves one of his own design. The 
clash of such starkly opposing forces as the supporters and detractors of the trial only continued 
to offer a disjointed narrative of the entire affair.  
While socialist authors, either connected to or disassociated from Trotsky, made efforts to 
offer an actual analysis of the trial, as opposed to a journalistic summary of events, their 
conclusions were also steeped in personal biases against the Stalinist system. While they may 
have denoted major differences between earlier Soviet show trials and the First Moscow Trial, 
the proceedings themselves became less important than the larger issues they could then be made 
to represent. As a result, the First Moscow Trial proved to be a means to a different end, namely 
the discounting of the current Soviet regime, either in part or in whole. The international nature 
of the trial served to strengthen its uses as evidence of their overall lack of support for the Soviet 
Union’s current course; the fates of sixteen men were only made so critically important because 
it served their purpose of criticizing the state. While their mistrust of major aspects of the USSR 
and the trial itself may have been merited, the facts raised by international pundits were lost 
amidst biased arguments and an intense need to prove a malicious intent on the parts of Soviet 
authorities. Even if individuals such as Adler and Shachtman disagreed on certain issues, they 
both considered the defendants’ confessions as proof of a conspiracy, though not the one 
publicized during the trial itself; such a reaction was practically the mirror opposite of the 
                                                 
247
 Shachtman, Behind the Moscow Trial, 47-53, 86-88. Shachtman further details the alleged Trotsky emissaries, 
which included Olberg, Berman -Yurin, David, and both Luryes from among the defendants. See pp. 89-115. Robert 
Conquest would share the same misgiving in his work. See Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 98. 
  
Gentry   84  
terroristic plot as understood by Pritt or Shepherd, who felt that the confessions proved guilt 
beyond any shadow of a doubt. No one argued that a conspiracy did not exist. 
Lev Sedov also authored a response to the trial, and few publications could boast a more 
outright connection to Trotsky. Despite receiving less press than Trotsky, Sedov was named in 
absentia at the First Moscow Trial, having been exiled from the Soviet Union at the same time as 
his father in 1929. Unlike Shachtman’s work, which makes little mention of the author’s 
connection to Trotsky, Sedov proudly proclaims himself as Trotsky’s son, both on the 
pamphlet’s cover and within its contents. Published in French in October 1936, The Red Book on 
the Moscow Trial only received an English translation decades later. Initially covering the 
historical backdrop of the USSR, Sedov soon moves into an analysis of the trial itself, where 
Trotsky is again named as the “principal defendant.”248 There is a constant condemnation of the 
Stalinist regime, whose leaders are often compared to the Thermidorians ( former allies of 
Maximilien Robespierre, who eventually denounced him in 1794, leading to his death).249 Such a 
dramatic connection is not made without a specific intent, as Sedov establishes a relationship, 
credited to his father, between the Soviet state and the regime that arose after the French 
Revolution.250 The author was purposefully utilizing his work to link the current direction of the 
Soviet Union to its general failure to enhance the lives of its workers in a different, yet still 
relatable, context. 
When it came to dissecting the trial itself, Sedov focused on the contradictory statements 
given by the defendants over the course of the event. While also noting the now-destroyed Hotel 
Bristol in Copenhagen, he remained fixated on undercutting Stalin by proclaiming the rise of 
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socialist forces in opposition to the current regime.251 He goes on to question the revolutionary 
record of State Prosecutor Vyshinsky, especially with regards to his Menshevik past. Sedov 
argues that Vyshinsky actively prosecutes Old Bolsheviks because he lacks the true Bolshevik 
spirit. However, according to Sedov, Vyshinsky is merely a symptom of the toxic atmosphere 
created by Stalin, and only one of many who will follow the same path. 252 Since the right of 
appeal was abolished in the wake of Kirov’s death, he considered that appeals were left available 
as an incentive for the defendants to follow the script and ultimately avoid death. As Anglo-
American journalists were rather confused by the speed with which the defendants were 
executed, this option offered an explanation that filled previously undetermined elements of the 
story. This effort also fits into Sedov’s goal of alerting “Western public opinion” concerning the 
significance of the trial.253 In a similar fashion to the socialists who sided with Trotsky in the 
wake of the trial, Sedov could not have known for certain that all of his claims  most notably 
that the defendants expected to be allowed to live by offering their full confessions  were true. 
Sedov was obviously not privy to the inner workings of the Soviet government at the time, 
meaning that such conclusions necessarily remain outside of his purview. By presenting such an 
unverifiable opinion as fact, it misleads the reader in a manner similar to the Soviet efforts that 
the author himself attempts to subvert.  
 As the English translation of Sedov’s work only appeared decades after the Russian and 
French originals, there is little to suggest that The Red Book could have reached a wide English-
speaking audience in 1936. However, the influence of Sedov’s research and words on Trotsky’s 
own work could not be ignored; indeed, by Trotsky’s own admission, many of his most famous 
books deserved to have his son credited as co-author. As such, Sedov made sure his work stood 
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as a defense of his father, in turn offering Trotsky the courage to stand and fight the wave of 
malice set against him (which was reignited by the trial), especially in the face of a constant 
threat of assassination.254 Sedov would not survive for long after the publication of The Red 
Book, as he died in 1938 from complications resulting from an appendectomy. The mysterious 
circumstances surrounding his death have never been fully resolved, with some sources claiming 
that he was the victim of an NKVD assassination.255 The truth may remain unknown, but 
Sedov’s contribution to the widening dissent against the First Moscow Trial cannot be ignored.  
 Indeed, the defense of Leon Trotsky became an issue of paramount importance, as he had 
been limited in his ability to present a response by the Norwegian government that hosted him. 
Less than two months after the end of the trial, the Provisional Committee for the Defence of 
Leon Trotsky was established in Britain with the explicit goal of clearing Trotsky of the charges 
laid against him. There was, however, not a great deal that the Trotskyist faction in Brita in could 
do in order to build support; perhaps owing to the rise of the Nazis, the contentious political 
landscape in Britain meant moves in league with Trotsky did not receive tremendous approval.256 
The various socialist political groups in Britain were also not unified in their reactions, which 
ranged from outright criticism (by the Independent Labour Party) to uncertainty (by the Socialist 
League, of which D.N. Pritt was a former member). 257 The Communist Party of Great Britain 
obviously followed the rhetoric of the Comintern, supporting the trial and the verdict. As a result, 
it was in the United States that Trotskyists truly found a domain in which to thrive.  
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Even before the American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky was fully 
established, there was a quick publication response to the trial, where reports and articles from 
mostly Trotskyist writers were brought together. By late 1936, World Voices on the Moscow 
Trials had combined works from British, German, and French authors, all translated into 
English, ultimately in an effort to indicate the unified atmosphere of those in support of Trotsky. 
The heated conflict between D.N. Pritt and Friedrich Adler was reprinted in part, albeit without 
the context that gave more authority to their claims. Such an absence was espec ially obvious 
with respect to Adler’s pamphlet, as no mention was included concerning his disassociation from 
Trotsky.258 The majority of the articles form a more united front wherein the authors, sometimes 
named and sometimes not, deride the weaknesses of the charges against the defendants, or the 
lack of evidence aside from their own confessions. Again, these are many of the same claims that 
others had previously considered, but the context in which they were published was very 
different. The pamphlet was issued with a specific purpose, chiefly concerned with establishing a 
basis of support for Trotsky in order to simplify his inevitable defense against the charges. 259 The 
decision to include pieces by potential opinion makers without the context that may have 
affected their credibility, as well as the choice to include few dissenting opinions, should indicate 
the biased nature of their efforts. Such a claim is not to imply that publications by individuals 
such as Pritt or Adler were less biased in their approaches, merely that the Committee continued 
to perpetuate the trend wherein only one side of the argument was offered serious consideration.  
The conflicting views emanating from these publications indicate the global atmosphere 
that existed in the late interwar era. Each author had their own reasons for trying to influence 
public opinion, with their justifications and arguments often conflicting with one another (at 
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times even surpassing ideology completely and becoming personal). There were many such 
cases during this period. One example was Louis Fischer, who arrived in the USSR in 1922, 
eventually acting as a reporter for the American magazine The Nation. He followed in Walter 
Duranty’s footsteps by thoroughly advocating for the Soviet regime. Although Fischer 
maintained certain personal uncertainties concerning developments in the Soviet Union, those 
would not manifest in his work, which eventually culminated in a denial of the 1933 famine. 260 
Despite neither Fischer nor Duranty actually attending the Trial of the Sixteen (as F ischer was 
busy covering the Spanish Civil War at the time and Duranty was out of the country), both men 
adopted the Soviet view of the verdict as their own. However, while Duranty claimed that the 
execution of the defendants proved their guilt, Fischer was inwardly less certain, although he 
continued to vocalize his support of the regime. He apparently held hopes that the Stalin 
Constitution (adopted in December 1936) would bring about democracy, and that trials were 
perhaps necessary to create a better future.261 Evidently, those hopes would prove futile, and 
Fischer noticed a significant difference upon his later return to Moscow in 1938. He eventually 
broke away from the Soviet Union after the 1939 nonaggression pact with Germany; Fischer’s 
works then admitted his efforts in falsifying the apparent prosperity he witnessed as time 
passed.262 These later acknowledgements of his own complicity do not erase his constant efforts 
to endorse the Soviet Union’s actions, regardless of his hopes for democracy in the USSR. 
Publications on the trial continued into the following year. The German playwright Lion 
Feuchtwanger also offered his take on the changing social landscape within the USSR. While 
concerning himself with the positive aspects of everyday life for Soviet citizens, he also regarded 
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the First Moscow Trial as the catalyst for a problematic international situation. Given his status 
as a popular writer, he was given special treatment during his trip to the USSR, even meeting 
with Stalin in the months after the trial’s end. As Feuchtwanger expressed his uncertainties 
concerning the proceedings, the Soviet leader responded with an affirmation of the existence of a 
grand conspiracy, citing the lack of documentary evidence as a classic example of the 
conspirators refusing to leave a paper trail. The author’s clear admiration for Stalin seemed to 
curtail further dispute, even though the international reactions to the trial had left him 
questioning the overall veracity of the charges. Perhaps to curtail his doubts, Feuchtwanger was 
soon invited to attend the Second Moscow Trial (in January 1937). It was during these 
proceedings that all of his doubts seemed to disappear; he even went so far as to claim that if the 
defendants were lying, he questioned “what truth is.”263 In his description of the Second Moscow 
Trial, Feuchtwanger, on the basis of his own observations, mirrored some comments once again 
championed by D.N. Pritt, including an explanation for the lack of evidence and claiming that 
torture could not have been used to garner the confessions. 264 Attending the trial in person added 
a significant weight to the author’s claims, and made sure that his book merited an English 
translation and publication, by the same publishing house as Pritt’s own response to the trial: 
Victor Gollancz, Ltd. In this instance, the publisher may have wished to emphasize a particular 
interpretation of the trial, even as more show trials were beginning to take place. In the end, 
Feuchtwanger’s initial uncertainties became secondary to signifying the overall success of a 
socialist nation. 
                                                 
263
 Lion Feuchtwanger, Moscow 1937: A Visit Described for My Friends, trans. Irene Josephy (London: Victor 
Gollancz, Ltd., 1937), 127-128, 133-135 (“what truth is”).  
264
 Feuchtwanger, Moscow 1937, 143-144, 151-153. The author claimed that all necessary and damning evidence 
had already been presented, so the trial only needed to focus on the defendants’ confessions. Later on, Feuchtwanger 
does offer some residual uncertainty over the need to make such trials public, but resolved that the increasing 
international tensions necessitated such an assertive reaction. See pp. 161-163. 
  
Gentry   90  
The controversial debate between the viewpoints of different authors, all seeking to use 
the trial as proof of their own positions, continued as the Great Terror began in earnest. Sam 
Darcy, a prominent American communist leader, wrote a pamphlet on the Second Moscow Trial. 
Since he was working for the Comintern at the time, Darcy was able to witness the proceedings. 
As a member of the Communist Party of the United States of America, Darcy’s opinions 
coincided with those of the prosecution. He made certain to ensure that he pointed out both the 
longstanding nature of the defendants’ terroristic conspiracies and the continued use of 
confessions as viable evidence. His major claims concerned Trotsky, and he even went so far as 
to call for extreme action to be taken in order to “eliminate” the exiled revolutionary. 265 He 
continued the established trend of show trial supporters who were actually witnesses at the 
proceedings, meaning he did not rely on second-hand accounts to support his argument.  
Ongoing attention was paid to the Moscow Trials by their detractors as well. Francis 
Heisler, a Hungarian-born lawyer working in the United States, held off the initial publication 
run of a pamphlet concerning the First Moscow Trial due to the upcoming second trial. After the 
close of those proceedings, he re-titled his work The First Two Moscow Trials: Why?, although it 
must be said that the first trial remained the primary focus of the pamphlet. Heisler offered a 
fairly interesting perspective, given that he was a socialist and believed in the necessity of the 
USSR, but wanted to try and understand why the trials took place. As such, there was less overt 
hostility in his words than in those by some of his contemporaries. However, Heisler’s 
immediate dismissal of so-called “bourgeois newspapers” for not having enough knowledge of 
the “factors” involved in the trials does indicate a position that seems to avoid an all- inclusive 
approach in offering information to his audience.266 Heisler was ultimately adamant that the 
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contradictions in the testimony of the defendants can raise serious doubts about the trial’s overall 
validity. In terms of the evidence itself, the author remains confused how such a weak offering 
ended in such a violent verdict, as the lack of conspiratorial documents is not indicative of a 
conspiracy.267 Heisler’s legal background meant that he could have offered a counter-argument 
to Pritt, although the English barrister’s name does not appear in this particular pamphlet. As 
such, Heisler’s views highlight the diverging outlooks of the Third International (headed by the 
Comintern) and the Labour and Socialist International. Even though the author firmly opposed 
the show trials, he remained supportive of possibilities represented by the Soviet Union.268 
There were many others who openly opposed or supported the verdict of the First 
Moscow Trial, as well as the successive show trials during the Great Terror. The public nature of 
these spectacles allowed for a wide and international audience to offer its responses and opinions 
on the verdicts, as they were far more documented than the changing dynamics affecting the 
Soviet masses during the Terror. Robert Conquest, in a fiery section of his Great Terror, named 
many Western individuals who openly supported the Moscow Trials (including Pritt, Duranty, 
and Feuchtwanger, among many others).269 The atmosphere in the West allowed for a greater 
range of public opinion to coexist (albeit not amicably), and fueled a large number of works that 
directly responded to the ongoing controversy. As opposed to the state sponsorship of a single 
all-encompassing opinion, the possibility existed for numerous conflicting views to face off in 
the public sphere. However, that freedom also meant that it was nearly impossible to access 
unbiased information about specific events, since the ideological stances were so deeply rooted 
in the many judgments surrounding the trial. Many of the accounts ranged far beyond the 
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courtroom proceedings that led to the deaths of sixteen men. The ultimate meaning of the trial 
became more significant than the event itself, and necessarily fluctuated as individual writers 
attempted to influence public opinion. 
The aftermath of the First Moscow Trial evidently resulted in a cavalcade of publications, 
each with the intent of swaying the audiences to their side. Even those that may have agreed on 
certain issues were never in complete unity, which indicates that the trial itself became secondary 
to what individual authors believed it represented to them or their causes. While the degree of 
their success might remain unknown, the efforts of these authors cannot be completely 
overlooked. As the months continued, the desire to control public sentiment increased, especially 
with the emergence of more show trials. Many of those implicated by the testimonies in the Trial 
of the Sixteen would stand as defendants in the later trials, including formerly prominent 
officials such as Karl Radek, Georgy Piatakov, Grigory Sokolnikov (who were all among the 
defendants in the Second Moscow Trial); Marshall Mikhail Tukhachevsky (who was tried in 
secret); and eventually Nikolai Bukharin, Alexei Rykov, and Genrikh Yagoda (all of whom were 
among the defendants of the Third Moscow Trial). Yagoda headed the NKVD during the First 
Moscow Trial several years earlier, so his presence indicated that members of the secret police 
were no longer above reproach. There is little to suggest that the controversies surrounding the 
initial Moscow Trial would not be replicated for later show trials, although further research 
concerning the Western landscape is needed.270 However, as the situation in Europe deteriorated, 
and the threat of global war once again loomed, the specific trials may well have lost their 
prominent place on the front pages of newspapers and the frenzied enthusiasm of many writers 
may have diminished. As the current work does not extend that far, all that remains to be said is 
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that the Case of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre provided interested parties with 
plenty of opportunities to offer their own conclusions concerning the trial, its legitimacy, and its 
ultimate significance. 
It remains difficult to prove the degree to which any of the works discussed in this 
chapter actually influenced public perceptions at the time. Individuals such as Adler and Pritt 
may have acknowledged each other’s arguments, but that recognition only led to a more resolute 
approach to their own ideas. Mainstream newspapers had a wide reach but lacked any firm 
analysis, while the more biased publications issued after the fact refused to consider conflicting 
viewpoints. If anyone cared enough to gather all the disparate sources concerning the trial, there 
would be no cohesive narrative of the event; what mattered more was whether an individual 
author either supported or opposed the Soviet Union (or landed somewhere in between). The 
existence of a single narrative or interpretation is not the desired result, nor is it being advocated 
for in the current study. However, the ability to be informed regarding a trial given significant 
prominence was marred by the countless conflicting interpretations that now enveloped the 
landscape and were readily accessible (for a price). These given meanings were influenced by 
individual biases, and the need to fit the story into larger political or ideological frameworks was 
the primary objective. In the end, the trial and execution of sixteen men in the Soviet Union was 
not the most important information as news of the trial spread to the West. The entire affair 
became a tool for those advancing ideological positions that were given a deeper significance 
after the verdict had already been carried out. Even though the trial lasted less than one week, the 
resulting controversies raged for a significantly longer period of time, arguably until the fall of 
the Soviet Union. 
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Conclusion – The Meaning Behind Ascribing Meaning 
 The difficulties in terms of spreading information about the Soviet Union by no means 
ended after the judges in the First Moscow Trial handed down their decision. The correspondents 
and opinion makers discussed in this work did not end their conflicts with this trial alone; they 
necessarily moved on, especially after the Stalinist regime did not fall and even conducted 
further show trials for the remainder of the late 1930s. When global war once again broke out, 
the priorities of all parties changed out of necessity. However, even the Allied victory and the 
end of the Second World War did little to change the atmosphere of secrecy in the Soviet Union. 
In the postwar environment, Western correspondents faced a new challenge and no longer met 
their Soviet censors face to face; instead, they merely passed their stories through a green curtain 
and silently awaited judgment. Although there were no doubt continued complaints, just as in the 
interwar period, Soviet officials responded to such mild agitations by interfering with the import 
of correspondents’ food supplies from Finland.271 This back-and-forth between the two sides 
likely continued throughout the rest of the Soviet Union’s existence.  
 Newspapers played a significant role in recounting the First Moscow Trial to an 
international audience. Aside from these sources, radio broadcasts offered an alternative means 
of spreading the news to the world, although they have not been readily considered here. Radio 
had been a viable means of communication since the end of the First World War, but its uses in 
terms of spreading the news throughout the United States were curtailed by a concerned 
newspaper industry. Roadblocks were set in place in the early 1930s to ensure the continued 
dominance of  newspapers, which sold stories to radio companies and prevented them from 
gathering news on their own. It was actually the 1938 Anschluss – and not earlier developments 
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in Moscow – that provided broadcasting companies like CBS with an opportunity to finally 
prove their worth. As the Germans annexed Austria, correspondents provided live on-air updates, 
which allowed for fresh perspectives without the delays attributed to newspapers.272 Clearly, the 
world was changing, and such changes did not extend to technology alone. 
Other opportunities existed for those wishing to circulate certain viewpoints as time 
passed. United States Ambassador Joseph Davies would provide a particularly polarizing 
depiction of the USSR. Beginning his appointment in November 1936, he would witness the 
Second and Third Moscow Trials. His stark insistence on the veracity of these trials would be 
shaped by the Western (and especially American) press corps, with whom he conversed deeply 
and often.273 His resulting publication, Mission to Moscow, would eventually be turned into a 
notorious Hollywood film in 1943, at a time when collaboration between the United States and 
the USSR was of paramount importance due to the war. The meaning behind the trials again 
seemed to be manipulated in order to fit into a larger ideological position. Charles E. Bohlen, 
who was an aide at the United States Embassy under Davies, before later becoming ambassador 
himself, would later recount the enormous ignorance of  Davies when it came to understanding 
the Soviet Union.274 
 Back in 1937, the American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky sponsored the 
“Commission of Inquiry into the Charges Made against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials in 
the aftermath of the Second Moscow Trial.”275 The resulting organization was commonly known 
as the Dewey Commission (named for its chairman, John Dewey) and the investigation was held 
in Mexico, where Trotsky was staying at the time. After several months of testimony and 
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investigation, the Dewey Commission eventually found that Trotsky and Sedov were not guilty 
of the charges laid against them in the Moscow Trials, offering numerous points to justify their 
verdict. The Dewey Commission published its findings in the frankly titled Not Guilty.276 The 
controversy surrounding Trotsky’s defense, and even his eventual acquittal by their standards did 
not save him in the end, as he was killed by an NKVD assassin in 1940. The Moscow Trials 
resulted in a significant number of documents aimed at defending or persecuting the man who 
was perhaps the most notorious target despite having never stood trial in a Soviet courtroom. 
However, the effects of the Dewey Commission were not altogether widespread, and few put 
much confidence in Trotsky’s defense.277 
As Stalin stood as an overarching figure throughout the trials (not sitting front and center, 
but never too far removed), his death in 1953 may well have ushered in some form of closure. 
However, Stalin’s successor, Nikita Khrushchev, was not willing to completely erase the 
complicated events of the 1930s. In his infamous “Secret Speech” at the 20th Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, Khrushchev exonerated some of the Party 
members who had been purged during the period. Despite opening the doors towards the 
rehabilitation of such victims, this amnesty was not extended to all, and the defendants of the 
First Moscow Trial were lumped into the group of “enemies of Leninism,” and therefore were 
not eligible for redemption. Although Khrushchev mentioned the past mistakes of Zinoviev and 
Kamenev did not necessarily mean that they should have been shot, he still did not pardon 
them.278 As a result, the legacy of the Moscow Trials continued to incite controversy whenever 
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they were mentioned within the USSR; such a statement was true in relation to the defendants 
executed after the Trial of the Sixteen, and especially so when it came to Trotsky. Even nearly 
twenty years later, Khrushchev’s continued insistence of a Trotskyite conspiracy stands as 
evidence of a desire to maintain a conspiratorial tone, and a refusal to face the past.  
 As the Cold War began, the ongoing uncertainties concerning the Moscow Trials within 
the Soviet Union extended somewhat to the West. Not all Soviet supporters followed Eugene 
Lyons, William Henry Chamberlin, and Louis Fischer in turning away from the USSR. D.N. 
Pritt maintained his “favourable impression” of the First Moscow Trial even upon writing his 
autobiography years later. He also attempted to utilize the views of Joseph Davies as evidence of 
his astute nature in perceiving the trials, although the controversy surrounding the American 
ambassador seemed to elude Pritt.279 In a similar vein, Walter Duranty never fully rescinded his 
rather positive view of the Soviet Union. As opposed to Pritt, whose connection to the Soviets 
seemed ideological, Duranty seemed more concerned with the practicalities of supporting the 
USSR over potential alternatives such as Nazi Germany. 280 
 The individual viewpoints of those who contributed to this contentious atmosphere aside, 
the spread of information surrounding the First Moscow Trial developed based on a lack of 
resources to process the information for Western audiences, as well as under the veil of the 
personal biases of the authors themselves. The result was a rather stagnant initial run through 
from the newspaper industry, which used the show trial in order to create publicity, but offered 
no meaningful consideration of the trial beyond what the correspondents were told. However, 
once the story ran its course and the defendants were executed, there was an immediate shift 
away from the trial and towards fresh newsworthy articles, which was not especially difficult in 
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the fraught environment of interwar Europe. In the aftermath of the trial, the entire affair became 
a demonstration of one’s total support for or opposition to the Soviet regime, depending on the 
standpoints of the individual authors. These authors often manipulated the verdict to fit into their 
predetermined ideological views concerning the direction of a burgeoning world power. While 
such an exploitation may have had little influence on those already entrenched in those political 
positions, it did little to offer Western audiences a means of understanding this particular event 
beyond these limiting points of view. 
 Aside from widening the “Western” lens, an interesting addition to this study would be a 
consideration of how sources changed over time, especially as more Soviet show trials took 
place over the following two years. Did newspapers continue to relay the standpoint of the 
prosecution without delving into the contextual nuances surrounding the trial? Did individuals 
and organizations attempt to utilize the trials as a means to support or oppose a political position 
after the fact, thereby altering the overall significance of the trials to fit into their own, previously 
established, views? The Trial of the Sixteen was a unique situation in that it was the first of the 
major Soviet show trials that resulted in the deaths of several Old Bolsheviks, but those that 
followed can offer further insight into how the trials developed in Western media outlets and 
other publications. Since Western correspondents were so integral in spreading news of the 
proceedings abroad, analyzing if their views concerning these public spectacles changed over 
time would be a worthwhile addition to our current understanding of how the Western world 
perceived the Soviet Union during the period, or at least how they were informed about it.  
 There is a difference in the spread of the news as it is understood today. As opposed to 
the lack of resources (in terms of potential costs and limited journalists) within the news 
industry, modern news has developed into a myriad of different possible sources. Radio, 
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television, innumerable online services, and even newspapers continue to offer a platform for 
interested parties to remain informed on stories from around a world made smaller than ever 
before. However, the same biases can still pervade each story, making it difficult to see events 
beyond the meanings attached to them upon their publication. At the same time, the constant 
influx of news makes it all but impossible to be informed about everything, which forces 
subscribers to choose between what they want to know about, which was likely always the case. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of this entire study is that it remains up to individual readers 
or viewers to determine the trustworthy nature of a source. Mindless acceptance of the endless 
conflicting viewpoints is not a viable option, so the onus remains on audiences in order to truly 
remain informed in the most responsible manner. 
 As a final note, Khrushchev’s refusal to dredge up the past and exonerate the Old 
Bolsheviks was not the end of their story. As part of Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms in the 
glasnost era, both Grigory Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev were finally declared not guilty in 1988, 
more than fifty years after their executions. While not formally reinstated into the Communist 
Party, the two were found to be innocent of their supposed crimes during the First Moscow Trial; 
indeed, the entire trial was said to be falsified, indicating a major turn in the Soviet Union’s own 
relationship with its complicated past. As the Soviet Union met its end several years later, it 
might be said that it was better late than never. Western correspondents in Moscow were sure to 
report on the story, albeit without the fanfare that surrounded the Soviet show trials decades 
earlier.281 There was little to sustain the attention of audiences beyond a single article, which 
merely noted the story without really exploring the subject further. However, there was enough 
intrigue to consider the story as front page news – if only for a day. 
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Appendix 1 – 
The Sixteen Defendants in the Case of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre  
(as ordered in the indictment) 
 
Although Leon Trotsky and Leon Sedov figured heavily into the trial, they were not included in 
the original indictment among the sixteen accused present at the proceedings.  
 
1. G.E. Zinoviev: Member of the Bolshevik Party since its 1903 inception, original member of 
the Politburo, chairman of the Leningrad Soviet, first chairman of the Comintern 
Executive from 1919-1926, close associate to Vladimir Lenin.  
2. L.B. Kamenev: Member of the Bolshevik Party since its 1903 inception, original member of 
the first Politburo, Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, acted as 
chairman of the Politburo throughout 1923, close associate to Vladimir Lenin (edited 
some of his publications. 
3. G.E. Yevdokimov: Early member of the Bolshevik Party, deputy chairman of the Leningrad 
Soviet, member of the Central Committee.  
4. I.N. Smirnov: Early member of the Bolshevik Party, fought on the Eastern Front in the 
Russian Civil War, deputy chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the 
National Economy (of the RSFSR), member of the Central Committee.  
5. I.P. Bakayev: Early member of the Bolshevik Party, active in the Russian Civil War, headed 
the GPU in Leningrad, member of the Central Committee.  
6. V.A. Ter-Vaganyan: Leader within the Armenian Communist Party, wrote many political 
works concerning Marxism. 
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7. S.V. Mrachovsky: Early member of the Bolshevik Party, military leader during the Russian 
Civil War and beyond. 
8. E.A. Dreitzer: Fought in the Russian Civil War, a decorated war hero. 
9. E.S. Holtzman: Connection to Zinoviev, little other information exists on this defendant.  
10. I.I. Reingold: Connection to Zinoviev, little other information exists on this defendant.  
11. R.V. Pikel: Connection to Zinoviev, little other information exists on this defendant.  
12. V.P. Olberg: Little information exists on this defendant, generally considered as the first 
defendant to offer evidence against others, suspected NKVD agent.  
13. K.B. Berman-Yurin: Joined the German Communist Party in 1923, acting on its regional 
directorate, emigrated to the USSR in 1933.  
14. Fritz David (I.I. Kruglyansky): Moved to Germany in 1926 to join its Communist Party, 
published several books, moved back to USSR in 1933.  
15. M. Lurye: Historian, member of the German Communist Party from 1922, spread 
propaganda, worked for the Comintern from 1933-1934. 
16. N. Lurye: Physician, member of the German Communist Party in 1925, emigrated to the 
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Appendix 2 – Meeting the Moscow Correspondents 
Foreign Correspondents present around the time of the First Moscow Trial:  
 Anna Louise Strong (Press representative for the Communist Party of the USA and the International 
News Service from 1921 on): No clear indication she witnessed the trial.  
 Charles Nutter (Associated Press, 1936-1937): Attended and wrote on the First Moscow Trial, then 
covered the Spanish Civil War from 1937-1938. 
 Donald Day (The Chicago Daily Tribune): His anti-Communist stance made it so he was not granted 
a visa into the USSR, thereby staying in Riga and not witnessing the trial.  
 Harold Denny (The New York Times, 1934-1939): Took over from Walter Duranty, witnessed and 
covered the First and Third Moscow Trials in substantial detail.  
 Joseph H. Baird (United Press): Wrote on the post-Kirov purges in 1935 for UP and was published 
in the Washington Post on August 15, 1936, did not witness the trial.  
 Joseph Phillips (The New York Herald Tribune): Spent time in Paris, London, Rome, Moscow from 
1927-1937, presumed to have been there in 1936 since he was claimed by US Ambassador Joseph 
Davies in Mission to Moscow (New York: Simon  Schuster, 1941) as accustomed to Russia, before 
leaving in 1937. 
 Louis Fischer (The Nation, 1923-1938): Did not witness the trial, covering the Spanish Civil War at 
the time, initially very supportive of the Soviet regime, a view which would change over time.  
 Norman Deuel (United Press): Attended and wrote on the First Moscow Trial published in US 
newspapers (see The Times Herald), later covered the Third Moscow Trial. 
 Spencer Williams (multiple papers, 1929-1940): Seemed to work on economic matters, wrote for 
Fairchild Publications, the Manchester Guardian, The Wall Street Journal, the Daily Herald, and the 
Columbia Broadcasting System, as well as representing the Chamber of Commerce. 
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 Walter Duranty (The New York Times, 1921-1936, continued on as Special Correspondent for the 
NYT until 1940): Did not witness the trial, yet still briefly wrote on it (See The New York Times 
August 17, 1936), did cover later show trials. An adamant supporter of the Soviet regime, he would 
publish a great deal on his time in the USSR, but would not act as a journalist after parting with The 
New York Times in 1940. 
Transferred out of Moscow before the trial: 
 Eugene Lyons (United Press, 1928-1934): Worked for the Soviet news agency TASS before 
beginning his stint with UP, would move away from his Soviet leanings during his time in the 
country. He would publish numerous works concerned with the effects of Soviet ideology.  
 Floyd Gibbons (The Chicago Daily Tribune, 1921): First Western reporter in Moscow, gone long 
before the First Moscow Trial.  
 Francis McCullough (New York Herald Tribune, 1921-1923): One of the core group of the first 
Western correspondents in Moscow, expelled in 1923 for using the American Relief Administration 
diplomatic pouch to smuggle out articles.  
 Gareth Jones (Western Mail, only really covered the Soviet Union surrounding the famine, 1932): 
Vilified by the other Western correspondents for his realistic depiction of the 1932-1933 famine. 
 George Seldes (The Chicago Daily Tribune, 1921-1923): One of the core group of the first Western 
correspondents in Moscow, expelled in 1923 for using the American Relief Administration 
diplomatic pouch to smuggle out articles, moved to work in Italy and Mexico. Would later become a 
freelance reporter and remain a significant journalistic force for years.  
 James Howe (Associated Press, worked in Moscow, London, Paris, Berlin, and more from 1921-
1934): One of the core group of the first Western correspondents in Moscow, not expelled with the 
rest, but not entirely clear when he left Moscow. 
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 Percy Noel (Philadelphia Ledger, 1921-1923): One of the core group of the first Western 
correspondents in Moscow, expelled in 1923 for using the American Relief Administration 
diplomatic pouch to smuggle out articles.  
 Ralph Barnes (New York Herald Tribune, 1931-1935): Wrote on the famine, later transferred to 
Germany. 
 Sam and Bella Spewack (Sam for The New York World, Bella for socialist/pacifist newspapers like 
the New York-based Call, 1921-1923): Two of the core group of the first Western correspondents in 
Moscow, expelled in 1923 for using the American Relief Administration diplomatic pouch to 
smuggle out articles, continued as journalists until they went back to New York to write screenplays.  
 William Henry Chamberlin (The Christian Science Monitor and the Manchester Guardian, 1922-
1934): Witnessed the famine, and although initially supportive of the Soviet regime, he would soon 
begin to harbor serious doubts, afterwards transferred to Germany.  
Came to Moscow not long after the First Moscow Trial: 
 Demaree Bess (The Christian Science Monitor, 1937): Mentioned by Davies in Mission to Moscow 
as being in Moscow in 1937, but not specifically in Davies's coverage of the trials. 
 Henry Shapiro (United Press, 1937-1973, off period from 1954-1955): Only arrived in Moscow in 
1937. 
 Joseph Fels Barnes (New York Herald Tribune, was in Moscow, Berlin, and New York from 1934-
1938): Mentioned by Davies in Mission to Moscow as presented there in 1937-1938. 
 Richard Massock (Associated Press, 1937-1938): Mentioned by Davies in Mission to Moscow as 
being present in 1937-1938. 
 
